THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973Chapter XXX).” Kissinger claims that he ignored this proposal when he met
Gromyko for a follow-up talk on 30 September, and that he demurred at declaring
the outlines of such a settlement at least until after the November 1972 elections, as
this would inevitably outrage Israel and its US supporters.^38
Kissinger’s contemporary report from this talk shows, however, that he did “check
with Gromyko whether the President had understood him correctly ... [that] the
Soviet Union would withdraw all organized military forces from the Middle East ...
as part of an interim settlement.” Although this was more than the Soviet minister
actually offered (withdrawal from Eg ypt), “Gromyko said correct—provided that the
interim settlement contained provisions for ... a final settlement.” And contrary to his
memoirs, Kissinger did agree to continue discussing this deal, with the “aim to have
the interim agreement by May,” the target date for the summit. He only stipulated
repeatedly that the Middle Eastern parties should not be informed—meaning mainly
the Israelis, as
this would produce an enormous outcry. ... Pro-Israeli groups control the US media to a
significant extent, it would be difficult for the President to agree to measures that would
seriously displease those groups during the election period. ... Once the election is over ...
Nixon will be able to implement a solution ... without paying a great deal of attention to
Jewish circles.Gromyko’s response (as Kissinger reported it), is in retrospect little short of comi-
cal: “The withdrawal of our air forces and other organized units will not be happily
greeted by our allies,” but Brezhnev, despite “some hesitation,” was acting out of
“global considerations.” Sadat was about to visit Moscow again, and Gromyko asked
Kissinger whether there was some possibility of both superpowers informing their
respective allies, in strict confidence. “I said ... the Eg yptians were incapable of keep-
ing a confidence. Gromyko laughed and said this was generally true, but in this case
it was to their interest to keep it, since if the agreement that might be reached at the
summit should leak, it would be aborted.”
Kissinger’s report does not indicate that he explicitly ruled out telling Sadat. His only
response was: “the more it [the agreement] was acceptable to Israel, the less concern one
had to have about secrecy.” Gromyko reported only “the intention is to talk to the top
leaders of Eg ypt and Israel at some stage ... but for the time being not to inform them.”^39
“At some stage” would be interpreted quite differently on both sides.
None of this appeared in Kissinger’s memoirs, and they add little more on the
matter for over 400 “numbingly long and stupefyingly detailed” pages covering eight
months, including the preparations for the Moscow summit in May 1972 and the
conference itself.^40 It was to be recorded, and credited to Kissinger, as the historic
apotheosis of détente. From September 1971 through July 1972, the memoirs con-
sistently downplay the importance of the Soviet withdrawal issue in the back-channel
talks, as well as Kissinger’s actual readiness to bargain over it, and the Middle East in