THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973plane,’ that is not a serious approach. You know that the balance of power between us
is not equal. Better to not let such things develop, rather than to make threats.”
Primakov stressed that there was zero chance of a US–USSR confrontation over the
Middle East, which Gazit understood as meaning the Americans would not respond
even if Soviets did get involved in fighting. Gazit retorted, and reiterated the next day,
“we will defend ourselves when attacked by Eg ypt, and clearly it will be hard to dis-
tinguish between [Soviet] forces and those of Eg ypt.”
An opportunity to demonstrate Soviet influence on Eg yptian policy arose when
the Israelis brought up the plight of their POWs in Eg ypt and requested the release
of four wounded prisoners, especially the seriously injured pilot Eyal Ahiqar.
Primakov received a detailed list and promised to check it out. He relates that when
Sadat was informed of the Vienna talks, this was included; Ahiqar was exchanged on
15 December.^45
But with this exception, the talks again adjourned inconclusively—just before the
IDF disclosed that on 10 October a Foxbat explicitly described as Soviet had come
within 30 kilometers of Ashqelon, Israel’s southernmost city on the Mediterranean
coast. Israeli military correspondents were told that “IAF planes were unable to make
contact”—that is, they failed to overtake the intruder. The matter was grave enough
to top the cabinet’s agenda.^46
This coincided with the long-delayed public announcement that the summit
would take place in May—and also with Sadat’s arrival in Moscow on 11 October.
Foreign Minister Riad noted Brezhnev’s interest in the details of Eg ypt’s contacts in
Washington and his advice “to cultivate the American connection.”^47 According to
Shazly, even though the Soviet advisers had argued that Eg yptian demands for weap-
ons were excessive, and not all were met when “President Sadat and General Sadiq
flew to Moscow,” they nevertheless “concluded our biggest arms deal so far with the
Soviet Union”—enough in Shazly’s view to enable the Minarets plan if not a deeper
incursion into Sinai.^48
Ashraf Marwan provided the Mossad in record time with a transcript of the talks,
which indicated only a partial acceptance of Eg yptian demands. As he reported,
Eg ypt’s Tu-16s were now authorized to fire their Kelt missiles without prior consulta-
tion with the Soviets, and discussions were to continue about the supply of Scud
tactical ballistic missiles. But in marked contrast with Brezhnev’s recorded perfor-
mance in talks with US leaders, Marwan depicted him as woefully uninformed on
the basics (not knowing, for instance, where the Sinai passes were). The Soviet mili-
tary specialists were even more incredibly described as ignorant of the Eg yptians’
existing Soviet-supplied armament (they supposedly believed the most advanced
tanks to be T-34s).^49
These Soviet-related clues may have been among those that initially aroused the
suspicion of Lt-Gen. David “Dado” Elazar when, presumably, he was first informed
about Marwan upon taking over as IDF chief of staff in January 1972: