FLEXING MUSCLES WHILE OFFERING A PULLBACKAbout [sanitized] I had a period of hesitation. For months I suspected that he was double,
and I had discussions about this with [sanitized; presumably Mossad chief Zamir]. Many
times I had the sense that his report was almost a message. I was very, very skeptical and
cast a lot of doubt on the credibility of [sanitized].But over time, Elazar told the Agranat Commission, “his credibility grew when we
began to receive [sanitized]. ... I never had absolute confidence, but I began to rely
upon him very, very seriously.”
Marwan became trusted as “a good source for warning within a range of days”
before any Eg yptian action. Indeed, he became the only intelligence source whose
raw reports were always shown to the chief of staff.^50 Achieving such status was a
major success in itself for Marwan as a double agent. In September–October 1973,
this exclusive Israeli reliance backfired when warnings from other sources were disre-
garded until Marwan confirmed them—too late for an effective response.
While the Eg yptian delegation was in Moscow, on 12 October 1971, the Israeli
cabinet formally rejected the latest version of the Rogers Plan. Israel, then, was not
about to volunteer the cover for a withdrawal of the Soviet forces, and it would have
to be obtained by the Americans—that is, Kissinger. Primakov states that he had a
final talk with the Israelis in Vienna on 15 October, when they in effect rejected the
Soviet proposals too, though they had taken the extraordinary step of conducting
business on Saturday. But it took another three weeks for the Israeli delegates to write
Primakov, “we reported to the leaders whom you met here [in Israel] that our talks
were useful; even though disagreement remains, it was important to learn each other’s
thinking.” They suggested keeping up periodic exchanges. Andropov and Gromyko
proposed only on 3 December, and the Central Committee approved with
Brezhnev’s knowledge, that Primakov be instructed to reply no more than “I too
reported. The assessment here is analogous to yours”—with no provision for a follow-
up. There things stood for nearly four months.^51
On 27 October, meeting Tactical Air Command (TAC) Commander Momyer,
Hod was adamant:
Israel will never agree to the terms of negotiation set forth by the US. Israel’s position is
clear and unequivocal, as stated by Golda Meir. In the judgment of most of the military,
war is only a matter of time and he is proceeding on that assumption. ... I asked if war
broke out what would be the role of the Soviets. He said the Russians will try to hold their
fighters in the Delta and along the coast, letting the Eg yptians do the fighting over the
canal and the Sinai. However, if the IAF penetrated the Delta, Cairo and Mediterranean
bases or Soviet bases, the Soviet fighters would open up the entire area to combat.^52D. A Foxbat over Tel Aviv while Sadat is “rebuffed” in Moscow
By late October 1971, Israeli spokesmen were treating MiG-25 flights over Israel as
an established fact, even though it had not been officially confirmed. Leaving for the