23. The Deal at the Summit and the “Expulsion” Myth
A. Kissinger blinks first on the conditions for Soviet withdrawal
Nixon and Kissinger arrived at the summit on 22 May, determined that the unre-
solved Eg yptian–Israeli conflict must not “poison” the all-important goal of détente,
which would reduce pressure on the administration in other arenas such as Vietnam.
The Soviets were likewise eager for progress on economic issues, among others, as well
as to secure a cover for the withdrawal they desired from Eg ypt. But as the talks
began, the Middle East deadlock appeared unchanged. On Kissinger’s advice, Nixon
told Brezhnev: “when Mr Gromyko reported to me that ... the Soviet Union would
be willing to withdraw its military forces—as distinct from advisers ... That was very
constructive. But that requires something from Israel that they simply have not done.”
Nixon’s mention of the troop withdrawal offer at a meeting attended by the entire
Soviet troika indicates his understanding that all of them, and presumably the full
Politburo, had endorsed this measure. He went on to say: “we have prepared a paper
on this matter ... in response to the one that you have prepared.”^1
Kissinger’s memoirs conspicuously omit any mention of such an American paper.
“The culmination” of the summit, he wrote in 1982,
was ... Gromyko’s agreement ... to a paragraph in the final communiqué so anodyne that it
permitted no other interpretation than Moscow was putting the Middle East negotiations
on ice. ... The Soviets were willing to pay some price for Détente. That, in any event, was the
perception of Anwar Sadat ... and it led to ... the expulsion of Soviet troops from Eg ypt.^2In an earlier installment of his memoirs, Kissinger stated even more flatly that “the
upshot was a meaningless paragraph [in the final communiqué] that ... was practically
an endorsement of the status quo and was bound to be taken ill ... in Cairo.”
Dobrynin concurred in his memoir: “The sides presented their positions ... But there
were no concrete advances on this question.”^3
The communiqué, however, was not the main product of the summit in respect of
the Middle East, and the record now shows that Kissinger too was willing to pay a