THE DEAL AT THE SUMMIT AND THE “EXPULSION” MYTHsance flights, which had been performed only by Soviet pilots. The detachment that
operated them was actually the last of the Soviet air formations to be withdrawn from
Eg ypt, and the only case in which real or staged discord has been reported. Several
post-Soviet sources indicate at least a partial withdrawal of the craft earlier.^55 But
there are more detailed testimonies that the flights ceased, and the last planes were
flown back to the Soviet Union, on 16 or 17 July 1972.^56 This change would certainly
have been noticed immediately by Israel, which was “painfully” aware of the MiG-25
intrusions because it still had nothing to counter them.^57
The Egyptians’ demand to acquire the planes had not yet been resolved. When, in
a discussion with Ivliev after Sadat’s announcement, Urwick referred to “the very
high-performance aircraft used for reconnaissance over Sinai,” the Soviet attaché
replied that their sale to Eg ypt “was under consideration and he did not yet know ...
but added that he privately thought the aircraft would be returned to the USSR.”^58
Evidence from 2008 shows that this had in fact already been decided. The urgency to
get the Foxbats out of Eg ypt was reflected by inter-agency competition in Moscow.
Abramov, the Air Force colonel on the Kavkaz staff, estimated that dismantling and
crating the planes would take a week, which caused his boss Krivoplyasov some
embarrassment: the aviation industry minister had told Grechko it could be accom-
plished in two days. Abramov pointed out that the faster process would require
sending twenty to thirty factory experts to Eg ypt, which would add an extra burden
to the transport flights (another indication that a mass repatriation was already being
planned). Krivoplyasov went back to Grechko, and the 63rd’s own ground crews were
given the week they needed—which indicates the timing of the original order.^59
One of the group’s pilots, V. Gordienko, related (and evidently was told at the
time) that after Sadat ordered a halt to the Foxbats’ reconnaissance flights, Moscow
issued an “ultimatum” to fly them back immediately, but Eg yptian tanks blocked the
runways before the An-22s could take off; “the crisis was solved by diplomatic
means.”^60 Bezhevets claims that the pilots were feted and decorated by Mubarak to
acknowledge the completion of their task to map out Israel’s defenses.^61
E. The field advisers: mass recall, gradual redeployment
An even more blatant exercise was timed for the days immediately before Sadat’s
announcement, in order to create the semblance of a sudden expulsion. This was a
sharp and obtrusive break in routine for the Soviet military advisers attached to
Eg yptian ground units. An Eg yptian document bearing the significant date of 16 July
1972 confirms that the 112th Infantry Brigade’s four Soviet “experts” and their inter-
preter “have handed over everything they had in their possession and are now unat-
tached.”^62 These “marching orders”—which must have followed previously issued
instructions—are exceptional in that all the brigade’s advisers departed simultane-
ously; their rotation was normally staggered.