THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973eskadra: “In June ... Sadat decided to forgo our advisers, and demanded in ultimative
form that they leave the country within two days.”^47
These versions all retain the unilateral-expulsion line, which may have been either
the only one handed down to the operational echelon, or the official version adopted
later. But either way, the June date appears to reveal that Heikal’s 8 July version con-
cealed earlier communication with the Soviets, and to confirm that Sidqi’s talks were
aimed at final coordination to announce a previously agreed move that was already
in progress.
When Sadat dropped his bombshell on 17 July, Soviet embassy official Akopov—
who had long argued for a withdrawal—describes Vinogradov as furious. It can only
be guessed whether this was mere pretense (like Kissinger’s response), or genuine
anger that Moscow had informed the ambassador so late about the adoption of his
own proposal. But given Vinogradov’s own mention of Sadat’s notification in June,
the latter seems unlikely. At any rate, Akopov soothed his boss: “Here we have Sadat
... facilitating the task for us to withdraw the Soviet specialists and advisors ... he
played in our favor.”^48
In Moscow, Chernyaev too considered, or was told: “Sadat ordered our military
personnel out of Eg ypt after all. It may be for the best—we will not be liable when he
tries to wage war against Israel and gets smacked once again. As for our ‘superpower
prestige’ ... in our time, it is not so precious.” He listed the event as second in impor-
tance that week, after a huge fodder-grain deal with the United States, one of the
Soviets’ main objectives at the summit.^49 As this, like the other responses to Sadat’s
move, can be interpreted in several directions, the ultimate test must be what actually
occurred both before and after his announcement.
D. The pilots leave first
The Soviet MiG-21 fighter squadrons had not gone into action against Israel since the
ceasefire of August 1970; the only air engagement reported in this period was on
13 June, when two Eg yptian MiG-21s were shot down as they tried, unusually, to attack
Israeli planes northeast of Port Said.^50 The Soviet airmen therefore could be gradually
and unobtrusively withdrawn before Sadat’s declaration. As the aircraft had always
borne Eg yptian markings, they were not easily distinguishable from EAF MiG-21s. A
pilot and political officer of the Soviet aviation group in Eg ypt, probably reflecting the
line he was instructed to propagate, wrote that “in June 1972, our units became redun-
dant, and they returned to the USSR.”^51 The same timing appears in memoirs of other
Soviet airmen.^52 One of them gives the exact date of 3 June.^53 At least some of the planes
were handed over to the Eg yptian Air Force.^54 But as both Sadat and Gromyko had
stressed, the training of Eg yptian pilots by Soviet instructors continued.
In contrast, the high-profile part of the Soviet airmen’s departure was made only
the day before Sadat’s announcement. This was the cessation of MiG-25 reconnais-