THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973front too, the Americans or Israelis might attempt to force a more favorable settle-
ment. “Smirnov,” the radio-technical expert, recorded that “the Eg yptian leadership
was concerned, though this was a completely different war ... that Israel was about to
land a blow.”^5 The Israelis felt a similar threat from Eg ypt, but on 1 December, Meir
still stated she did not expect Soviet combat involvement. “If the Russians didn’t do
that at the time of their massive presence in Eg ypt ... they can’t be assumed to do so
now, under fundamentally changed circumstances, when ... the Russians ... are liter-
ally dependent upon the West.”^6
An Eg yptian attack was now deemed possible nonetheless, based on information
from Marwan and others. Israel’s concern was communicated to Nixon, Kissinger and
CIA Director Helms.^7 The tone of Eg yptian statements indeed changed abruptly, in
a matter of weeks. Shazly told Al-Ahram that war was near and “Eg ypt must make do
with the arms it has.”^8 Sadat, in parliament, repeated more than a dozen times that
war was inevitable, and announced “practical measures” to prepare it. Friendship with
the Soviet Union, he said, was still “a major factor, though the limitations of every
friend must be understood.”^9
These “practical measures” were soon noticed by “Lt Smirnov”: “they moved all the
combat equipment from its permanent storage facilities to the desert and deployed
it in hardened positions. ... ‘Our’ [superior] Baranov was summoned ‘upstairs.’ He
returned unusually grim,” and announced a 24/7 alert. When asked against what
emergency it was aimed, “he barked back” that there might be a need for “repair of
radio-location equipment”—that is, an attack on the SAM array was expected. “After
cooling off a bit, he added more softly: ‘God forbid.’ In those days, hearing such
words from an atheist and communist was simply extraordinary.”^10
This account corresponds with “tentative indications of Eg yptian intent to reopen
fire” that were detected by Israeli intelligence in December.^11 It would be the first of
several false alarms that contributed to dulling Israeli readiness. Then, “Smirnov”
relates, “everything settled down. After completing the bombings, the Americans
returned to the table and concluded the Paris talks [on Vietnam]. Nobody attacked
Eg ypt, the equipment was brought home from the desert, all the radar stations
remained intact and Western tourists again calmly posed for photos at the pyra-
mids.”^12 Both superpower leaders declared to their entourages that they would now
more actively seek political progress in the Middle East. On 2 February, Chernyaev
of the Central Committee International Department noted a statement by Brezhnev
in the Politburo: “let Sadat think about what the end of the war in Vietnam means
for him. Andropov and Gromyko are assigned to look for new ways to establish
contact with Israel.”^13
But there was little change of tone toward Israel in a note that Dobrynin handed
to Kissinger on 28 January—one day after the formal signing of the Paris accords.
Convinced that Kissinger was not about to deliver on the summit deal, Dobrynin