THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973the Nixinger model of realpolitik.”^6 Any remaining intention to detach Kissinger
from Nixon’s Middle East policy (or foreign policy in general) had gone by the board
as Watergate escalated. After 30 April, when the president’s top aides resigned or were
deposed, he was not about to cut loose from his main untainted retainer, and
Kissinger’s hegemony remained unchallenged. In Moscow, by contrast, Brezhnev’s
loyalists Andropov, Grechko and Gromyko were appointed to the Politburo on
27 April. Only Andropov had previously been even a candidate member.
In mid-April, Israel received the first definite indications of Eg yptian intent to
resume hostilities. This was based apparently on observation of the intensified activity
described by “Smirnov,” but also on the same signal that would be repeated in
October: the repatriation of twenty-eight families of Soviet advisers from Eg ypt.^7 In
the previous alerts (at end of the 1971 “year of decision” and in November–
December 1972), Israeli military intelligence had downplayed the Eg yptian moves
as maneuvers and was seemingly borne out when no offensive materialized; it now
repeated the same estimate. IDF Chief of Staff Elazar and Defense Minister Dayan
were more apprehensive, and after an inner-cabinet meeting on 18 April, the IDF
enacted a plan codenamed “Blue-White” to improve readiness for war that summer.
The cost of about $15 million, a hefty outlay in Israeli terms, was criticized when the
summer passed uneventfully, but was credited in hindsight for providing the where-
withal to contain the Eg yptian offensive in October.^8 On the other hand, this third
ostensible vindication of MI’s reassuring estimation that Sadat would relent from war
reinforced its disastrously erroneous repetition six months later.^9
Bar-Joseph holds that a warning from Ashraf Marwan on 11 April was instrumen-
tal in causing the Israeli decision, and presents it as evidence of Marwan’s genuine
value for Israel.^10 When his warning was received in October, it was taken seriously
despite his handlers’ recollection that he had “cried wolf ” in the spring.^11 Moreover,
the aforementioned evidence whereby the postponement of the Eg yptian–Syrian
offensive to the autumn had already been decided by April (which, if Marwan was
indeed privy to Sadat’s closest secrets, he should have known), calls his motives into
even greater question.
It also casts doubt on the widespread assumption that a genuine Arab decision to
attack was postponed at Soviet behest after an earlier timing had been set; this is
usually connected with the preparations for the San Clemente Summit or with these
talks themselves. Lower-level Soviet officials, such as Akopov, were indeed told that
“Brezhnev visited the United States and Sadat was told to wait a bit after the visit was
over, not to weaken our position.”^12 But this time, Kissinger’s aides were closer to the
mark in evaluating “indications of Arab intentions to initiate hostilities,” when they
suggested that these were part of “an effort to arouse international concern and put
psychological pressures on Israel and the US.”^13 Sadat himself (among several ratio-
nales that he gave for the postponement) claimed that he had preferred to await the
summit’s outcome.^14