“WE WILL BE TWO ISMAILS”Israel received several suspiciously “identical” tips that Eg ypt and Syria had acceded
to Soviet requests to delay the war until after the summit, in the hope that the talks
would produce a desirable settlement.^15 However, shortly after the Yom Kippur War,
Israeli commanders testified that they also had reports whereby, regardless of political
developments, “Assad had decided to postpone the offensive from May to September,
on the grounds that the Syrian army was not ready, mainly in aerial defense and also in
tanks.” These reports were followed by Syrian deployment of a “dense air defense array
on the Golan, which made it taboo for [our] planes and raised the question of offensive
intent.”^16 A Soviet serviceman recently confirmed that he was in a large contingent of air
defense advisers that was dispatched to Syria in April, and instructed how to act when—
rather than if—hostilities erupted.^17 On 30 April, the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s research
department endorsed a Mossad assessment that war was inevitable by October.^18
Kissinger was allowed to indulge in the conceit that Soviet concern for the summit
and prior detection of preparations for a spring offensive had enabled him to scotch
it. Meeting Brezhnev at the latter’s dacha on 7 May, he ran through a detailed list;
Brezhnev responded with the Soviets’ information about “Blue-White”:
Kissinger: We have some military information ... of various movements in the Arab world.
... Airplanes, military forces.
Brezhnev: Yes.
Kissinger: Within Eg ypt, they have moved what we call SA-6 surface-to-air missiles to
within 20 miles of the Suez Canal. They have received 30 Mirage fighters from Libya. They
have moved Tu-16 bombers, which you gave them, from Aswan to Cairo. There is a high
state of alert in the Eg yptian Air Force, and reservists have been recalled. They have moved
some commando units closer to the Suez Canal. ... We do take it very seriously, and there
is a possibility that there is a plan to do something before the summit to force us into joint
action. ...
Brezhnev: That’s not bad intelligence. Israel also is recalling its reservists and has banned
holidays and vacations for doctors. And they have deployed advance hospitals with a capac-
ity for 1,000 wounded.He persisted with the Soviet line that détente notwithstanding, the Soviets could
not restrain the Arabs if a settlement were not reached that met their demands—
which he knew Kissinger could not deliver:
all good things done by us... at the Summit of achieving Détente and avoiding a confronta-
tion will all be scrapped. ... So where do we go from here?
Kissinger: Well, of course, we have your proposed principles. And I will see—I expect—
Mr Ismail the end of the next week.
Brezhnev: I too have met our Ismail, another Ismail. I will probably become an Ismail too.
And you too will become an Ismail. And then we will be two Ismails.^19