THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973be put to its first operational test in the war.^44 Israeli military intelligence (as claimed
by its then-chief, Ze’ira) first detected the missiles’ arrival on 24 August 1973—
upending a previous estimate that they would not be supplied before 1976.^45 Ze’ira’s
deputy gave a differing version: that the first reports of the Scuds’ delivery were ini-
tially dismissed, because MI believed up to that point, “on good evidence,” that the
Eg yptians had given up entirely on obtaining the missiles.^46 Perhaps this disparity is
because only Ze’ira himself was privy to the dispatches of Ashraf Marwan, who had
reported the Scud sale on 20 May. According to an MI document from September
1973, Marwan reported in late July that “the Soviet ground-to-ground missiles would
be deployed” by the end of September.^47 If, as now seems probable, the deal was in the
works since Ahmed Ismail’s visit in February, Marwan’s message was late, but came
just long enough before the missile’s expected detection in Eg ypt to “prove” his
value.^48 The same would apply to Marwan’s fateful warning in October.
It was now assumed that training Eg yptian crews would take at least until the
following year (estimates ranged from February to April). This disregarded the pos-
sibility that the Eg yptians had been trained in advance; and while “theoretically, the
Soviet instructors themselves could fire the missiles at targets in Israel, based on past
experience it could be concluded that this prospect was remote.” Therefore, Israeli
intelligence appraisals up to the war’s outbreak doubted that the Scuds’ delivery had
fulfilled Sadat’s requirement for long-range offensive capability. Even the more alarm-
ist officers admitted that this detracted from their suspicion that the “Concept” had
become outdated.^49
Despite the missiles’ categorization as offensive weapons, the Israelis defined the
prospect of their use as defensive: the Soviets were perceived as drawing their tripwire
for approving an Eg yptian launch at the ceasefire line, that is, at the canal. Possibly
because ballistic missiles came under the purview of IAF intelligence, this was per-
ceived by the Israelis mainly as applying to any new attempt at “depth bombings”
(which indeed were not attempted in Eg ypt, unlike Syria, throughout the 1973 war).
The official IDF history confirms that the Scuds indeed deterred Israel from attacking
the Eg yptian hinterland during the war—which, it claims, was Sadat’s main motive,
rather than initiating launches against Israeli targets.^50 But the tripwire function
could equally apply to a ground crossing of the canal—which in the event did trigger
the Scud launches.
Evidence presented to the Agranat Commission that was released only in
September 2012 shows Mossad chief Zamir telling Meir on 23 August 1973—a day
before the date given by Ze’ira for detection of the missiles’ arrival—that according
to information received from the CIA, the Soviets had deployed in Eg ypt a brigade
of Scuds “which have nuclear and chemical warheads.” Either Zamir or the meeting’s
note-taker misunderstood “nuclear-capable” as meaning “nuclear-armed,” or the US
agency was frightening the Israelis with information that it did not have.^51 On the day