“WE WILL BE TWO ISMAILS”operational orders were issued to the top echelons. The date would be pinpointed a
few weeks later.^38
An Eg yptian military circular on 12 August reminded field units of standing
orders that visits by Soviet advisers had to be pre-authorized and escorted. Besides
confirming the advisers’ continued presence, the perceived need to refresh the proce-
dure may have stemmed from stepped-up Soviet activity.^39 Moscow’s support for the
intensifying war preparations is borne out by Bulgarian documents whereby “despite
the disagreements in the period August 1972–July 1973,” delivery of Ahmed Ismail’s
desiderata continued apace. “On the eve of the October War against Israel,” the Soviet
Union supplied Eg ypt with (among other armaments) 100 MiG-21 fighters, ten
Tu-16 bombers, 150 T-54/55 tanks, ninety of the latest T-62 model, and most obtru-
sively, sixty SAM-6 missile launchers.^40 By early October, the Israelis estimated the
Suez missile shield to consist of 150 “batteries”—i.e., divizyons—forming a “severe
obstacle” to IAF reconnaissance as well as operational activity 20 kilometers east of
the canal.^41
Allowing for the unclear definition of “eve of the war,” this was quite closely
approximated by the CIA’s estimate in June, except that it modified the numbers with
deprecating qualifiers and an emphasis on the lasting mark of the Soviets’ “ouster”:
sixty MiG-21s that had been operated by the Soviets in Eg ypt were turned over to the
Eg yptians following the expulsion. Since then, only seven MiG-21s, 15 Su-17 fighter
bombers, and two helicopters have been delivered. Although the Soviet-manned SA-6
missile equipment defending the Aswan Dam was shipped back to the USSR ... SA-6s for
Eg yptian units started arriving in Alexandria last September. Other identified cargos have
included T-62 medium tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, vehicles, and support
equipment.Despite the new models it listed such as the Su-17s, T-62s and SAM-6s, the
memorandum considered these shipments as “designed to maintain Cairo’s arms
inventories rather than to introduce new weapons systems.” Dualistic harmonization
was resorted to again: “this outward cooperation between the two countries has not
been matched by the restoration of mutual confidence.”^42
Neither list even mentioned the second key for Eg ypt’s offensive capability, accord-
ing to the Israeli “Concept”: the Scud ballistic missile. Several dates have already been
quoted for Moscow’s agreement to supply the Scuds, but its delivery is now docu-
mented from the Soviet side as beginning shortly after the California summit. “In the
middle of July [1973], together with the hardware for deployment of an Eg yptian
operative-tactical brigade, a group of Soviet missile specialists arrived in Cairo under
command of Colonel Sal’nikov,” as recorded by an interpreter with the outfit, which
was sent on a six-month mission “to train the Eg yptians.”^43
The interpreter of the Scuds’ fueling platoon wrote anonymously in February 2009
that the missiles were of a new and advanced variant, R-17E (Elbrus), which would