THE ULTIMATE TEST OF ASHRAF MARWANManufacturing a provocation that could legitimize the offensive was almost an exact
replay of preparation for war in May 1967. The preplanning of this propaganda cam-
paign—as with the Kiev hotels—is illustrated by advance instructions to the Soviet
media “to keep space available for stories on the Middle East.”^35 The Israeli aerial victory
over Syria on 13 September was held up as “a provocation to prepare an Israeli attack.”^36
As Kissinger would later claim, Eg yptian Foreign Minister Mohammed el-Zayyat
informed him on 6 October that “the Russians were telling us there was a concentration
[of Israeli forces] on the Syrian front.”^37 Given the Soviet awareness of Eg yptian–Syrian
plans, even if they were informed only on the 4th, this fabrication was even more egre-
gious than in 1967, and just as obviously coordinated. It tends to confirm our finding
that the Soviet warning in ’67 too was an agreed signal and propaganda cover rather
than a deliberate misleading of Moscow’s allies or mere error.^38
Repeating its erroneous interpretation of the Soviet warning in May 1967, Israeli
intelligence construed the Soviet charges as disinformation aimed at Moscow’s Arab
clients: “the Soviets are conducting unusually great political activity in Eg ypt these
days.” They were judged as still “fearful of an Eg yptian rapprochement with the
United States,” but military intelligence interpreted Brezhnev’s omission of the
Middle East in a speech in Tashkent as “reliably reflecting the issue’s low priority.”
Large concentrations of Syrian troops, artillery and tanks were detected, but were
attributed to Syrian “apprehensions about us, which apparently were fed by the
Russians,” rather than offensive intent. This was also the rationale given for similar
preparations that were observed in Eg ypt, although such a response to an alleged
Israeli threat hardly conformed to the description of the Eg yptian “big troop concen-
trations” as “a large-scale exercise for capturing Sinai.”
Eban claimed (after the fact) that when he met Kissinger on 4 October, “the US
was unaware of any impending crisis.” The “main point of the talk” was the secretary’s
suggestion that after the Israeli election scheduled for 30 October, Eban should come
again to America “to get a negotiating procedure in motion,” hinting that their
Eg yptian counterpart would be there too and joking that Sisco had “drawers full of
plans.” Although by then they both had reports about Eg yptian as well as Syrian
troop concentrations—the Americans had requested an urgent Israeli assessment on
1 October—Eban said these were not discussed “because there had already been false
alarms on six occasions since 1970.”^39
Despite some dissenting opinions, neither the Soviet evacuation nor the Arab
military buildup, much less the other indications, were thus taken by the top leader-
ship in Jerusalem or Washington as conclusive evidence of a looming war until after
midnight (Israel time) on the night of 4–5 October. Zamir’s office then received, and
relayed to his assistant Alfred Eini, a telegram from Marwan in London. As revealed
by Eini’s testimony before the Agranat Commission (with Marwan’s name still
excised), this cable not only included a code word that “the angel” had set in a meet-