THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973ing with Zamir a month earlier; bizarrely, the cable also explicitly specified the code
word’s significance: an imminent war.
Eini’s disclosure caused one of the commission members to point out that Marwan
could safely do so only if, being a double agent, interception of the cable would not
compromise him. Eini responded with the unconvincing suggestion that if Marwan
had been working for the Eg yptians, he would have relayed no warning at all. Marwan
insisted that he would give further details only to Zamir in person. Asked whether
Marwan could have been unaware what damage might be caused by the resulting
delay, Eini replied only that the agent “did not take [this] into consideration.”^40
Zamir grasped the import of the message only after Ze’ira shared with him the
incoming reports about the Soviet evacuation. Still, Zamir awaited the first com-
mercial flight to London on the morning of the 5th. Some three hours after he took
off, the Israeli leadership considered requesting the United States to “ask the Russians
why they are going home.” Ze’ira, certain that the Americans were still unaware of
this, objected that it would give away Israel’s sources. He still considered that “if the
Russians think the Arabs are going to war, that is against the Russians’ advice and it
proves they have no influence.”^41
Meanwhile, based only on “the telegram” (Marwan’s original message), Eban was
alerted in New York to arrange an urgent meeting with Kissinger, but most of the day
had elapsed by the time he received a new “briefing” for the secretary. Eban was to
ask Kissinger to tell the Arabs and Soviets that any expectation of an Israeli offensive
was unfounded, but that Israel would respond forcefully to any attack. Kissinger’s
deputy at the NSC, Brent Scowcroft, responded gladly to Israel’s “reassuring” esti-
mate, and said the Americans concurred. “I heard after the fact that they thought, ‘it’s
May 1973 all over again,’” Eban told the Agranat Commission, “Then we went to
pray Kol Nidre [the opening prayer on Yom Kippur eve].” Eban didn’t believe
Kissinger passed the requested message on to either the Arabs or the Soviets, as it was
not considered immediately urgent. Kissinger confirmed after the war that the overall
tone of the Israeli warning was “unemphatic” and he felt safe to delay contacting the
Soviets until the next day.^42
Zamir finally met Marwan only at 10 p.m. that night, and by the time “the angel’s”
most famous and controversial message was coded, transmitted and delivered in
Israel, it was 3:40 a.m. on Saturday, Yom Kippur. Besides a positive assertion that a
war was imminent, the message included what was by this time disinformation,
whether Marwan knew it or not: that the attack would begin “before sunset,” which
was interpreted in Israel as meaning 6 p.m. If this had been correct, it would have
given the Israelis less than twenty hours’ warning ; in the event, the attack was four
hours closer. This discrepancy might perhaps be explained as reflecting older informa-
tion about the Syrians’ preferred zero hour—in which case the question arises of why
Marwan didn’t volunteer it earlier.