THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973These transcripts show that Kissinger confessed to Dobrynin that “until an hour
ago I did not take this seriously”—and Dobrynin’s actual response shows that “eva-
sive” was quite an understatement. It was 6:40 a.m. His monosyllabic replies to most
of the American’s dramatic statements were understood by Kissinger that he was
“obviously waking him up.” This, however, can hardly explain part of the exchange:
“K: ... ‘this is very important for our relationship, that we do not have an explosion
in the Middle East right now.’ D: ‘What is our relationship?’”
Kissinger let pass this disavowal of any mutual commitment, personal or official.
The Soviet ambassador did not even bother to mention the Soviet accusations about
Israeli concentrations, much less an actual Israeli attack. He promised only to relay
Meir’s reassuring message, but Kissinger told the Israeli Deputy Chief of Mission
Mordechai Shalev a few minutes later, with no apparent basis, that Dobrynin “said
they will cooperate with us.”
Later that morning, asked by White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig about
the Soviet attitude, Kissinger still held “that they are trying to keep it quiet and they
are surprised.” He told Dobrynin that charges of Israeli attacks were “baloney,” but
did not confront the ambassador over Soviet complicity—which he suggested to
Nixon five minutes later. Barely an hour after the shooting started, Kissinger was
aiming to “get the fighting stopped and then use the opportunity to see whether a
settlement could be enforced” with Soviet cooperation. Within another few minutes
he was offering “to take a neutral position” in the UNSC, as “we don’t know who
started but are in favor of the status quo ante,” and to proceed according to his and
Nixon’s agreement with Gromyko.^48
Late on the second day of the war, Kissinger still professed to believe a “friendly
message” from Brezhnev that “the Russians pulled out all their advisers against the
wishes of the Arab governments,” as “we have confirmed this through our sources.” The
Soviets, he estimated, “quite honestly ... were taken aback by what the Arabs did. They
knew about it two days in advance. So there are no Russians involved.”^49 It was only
when Kissinger briefly left a Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) meeting the
same evening that the others dared to second-guess this sweeping exoneration:
Mr Sisco: I’ve heard Henry say that all the Soviet advisers are out, and I thought some were
still there. We need a clarification of that ... I thought there was a residue of Soviet advisers
still there.
Mr Colby: They have some people working on the Helmand [sic; he must have meant
Helwan] plant.
Mr Sisco: I thought they still had some involved in radar and some training.Then Kissinger returned, and no one pressed the issue.^50 But his colleagues’ doubts
were actually underestimated. Not only was it never the case that all the advisers left
Eg ypt; more had actually arrived in the run-up to the war, and yet more—as well as
Soviet regulars—were to follow.