THE ULTIMATE TEST OF ASHRAF MARWANBar-Joseph glosses over the tardiness of Marwan’s warning with a suggestion that
his original message was only a general alert, and he happened to find out the final
timetable for the Arab offensive only from a friend in London while Zamir was en
route there. Besides stretching credibility (e.g., how, in his first cable, Marwan could
have promised data he did not yet have, or how “a friend in London” might have it),
this reduces Marwan’s importance and access to information to near-trivial—cer-
tainly not worth the $100,000-plus that he was paid in this case alone.^43
In what concerns this study most directly, Marwan took care to tell Zamir that
“the Russians will take no part in the war.”^44 If the wrong zero hour that he provided
can somehow be excused, the following pages will show that this statement was
utterly false—and suggests strongly that, as before, Marwan served as a disinforma-
tion conduit for the Soviets as well as the Eg yptians. It corresponds so neatly in
content and timing with the other, simultaneous measures described above that dis-
cerning an overall deception pattern is hardly escapable. Marwan’s message, like the
dependents’ evacuation, succeeded beyond any reasonable expectation: the Russians
were provided with deniability, without compromising the Eg yptian operation by a
timely call-up of Israeli reserves.
C. 6 October: zero hour for Arab offensive and Soviet resupply
Reading “the cable from Tzvika [Zamir]’s guy” Marwan before an urgent ministerial
consultation that was convened at 8:05 a.m on 6 October, even the “previously skep-
tical IDF Chief of Staff Elazar concluded that it was ‘authentic’”—and that the ten
hours’ notice was “‘very short for us.’” Defense Minister Dayan reported that “this
business of the Russians’ departure has already become large-scale. It’s ongoing.
Thousands are leaving.” He did, however, speak of “panicked” evacuation of “Soviet
families” alone, and considered that “it’s essential for us to try and settle this intelli-
gence-wise with the Americans.” The latter, Dayan said, “so far have stated that they
see no preparations for war. They can’t explain the withdrawal of the Russian depen-
dents” or “a lot of other things.” Among these other concerns, Dayan raised the spec-
ter of attacks with Scud and Frog missiles.^45 A partial call-up of reserves was begun,
but Meir took care to assure US Ambassador Kenneth Keating that a full mobiliza-
tion was not under way and Israel had no offensive intent.^46
Eban received the alarming report of Marwan’s message at 5:30 a.m New York time
and informed Kissinger within half an hour. Within another hour, Kissinger reported
back that he had spoken with Eg yptian Foreign Minister Zayyat, who claimed that
Israel had launched an air and naval attack, and with Dobrynin, who—as Kissinger told
Eban—was “evasive.”^47 The latter term—indeed, both conversations with Eban—do
not appear in the blow-by-blow account of that day that Kissinger published in 2003,
where he claims to have been awoken by Sisco with Keating’s report.