THE SOVIET NUCLEAR THREAT“some thousand men signed up.” Goldstein and Zhukov, quoting from Semenov’s
unpublished manuscript, conclude that “this resort to volunteers is a sign that the
eskadra was to some extent in over its head.” But as in 1967, the “volunteer” character
of the force is risible.^25 Although, as Zaborsky states, “the bulk of the naval infantry
force was still in Sevastopol preparing for deployment into the Mediterranean,” the
landing ships would have carried their routine complement of marines, unless they
had disembarked at Port Said before the ships left harbor around 3–4 October.
Finally ordered to carry out the mission at the height of US–Soviet tension on
24 October, Capt. Semenov wrote: “Seems we’re going to save Port Said from the
Israelis.” Like the routine Soviet “garrison” there in previous years, the force now
included three SAM destroyers, a BDK (large landing vessel) and two SDKs (medium
landing vessels). An Israeli advance on Port Fuad, which had first been proposed by the
IDF and supported by Dayan as early as 7 October “because the Soviets have evacuated
Port Said,” was repeatedly postponed and finally ruled out by the prime minister on the
22nd. This was after a meeting with Kissinger, and partly out of fear that it would trig-
ger the missile launch at Israel that Sadat had threatened.^26 Whether or not the Soviets
were aware of this, their landing was called off “at the last minute,” but the ships appar-
ently returned to Port Said as others did to Alexandria.^27
No evidence has emerged so far that the “nuclear warheads” ship’s detection was so
much as mentioned in any of the discussions that led to the declaration of
Defcon-3—or for that matter, that the United States was aware of any other Soviet
nuclear preparations, such as the Foxbats’. Kissinger’s virtually singlehanded initiation
of the alert quickly became public and highly controversial; while its genesis is
beyond the scope of this study, it can be assumed that Kissinger—under heavy criti-
cism for supposedly political motivation, three days after the “Saturday Night
Massacre”—would have cited such a very apt motive as a Soviet nuclear threat, had it
really led to his decision. Even in retrospect, he mentioned only the menace of inter-
vention by Soviet conventional forces, “the ... sense of impending crisis” when “eight
Soviet An-22 transport planes each capable of carrying 200 or more troops were
slated to fly from Budapest to Eg ypt.”^28 The much closer marine landing went either
unknown or unmentioned. In this case, contemporary documents published in 2008
bear out Kissinger’s memoirs. More than a month later, he maintained in a briefing
to the congressional leadership “we don’t think the Soviets have put them [nuclear
weapons] in.” He also came as close as a US official ever did both to confirming that
Israel possessed nuclear weapons, and to admitting he had been informed that their
use had been contemplated: “should Israel brandish nuclear weapons, the Soviets
would counter it and it would be very dangerous for Israel.”^29
But on the night of 24–5 October, Kissinger’s statements, as recorded by Adm.
Moorer, reflect no concern about a Soviet nuclear danger to Israel. Rather, they
reflect his discomfiture both at Nixon’s weakened position and at the apparent unrav-
eling of his own policy linchpin: