NOTES
pp. [xvii–xxii]^
- George W. Breslauer, Soviet Strateg y in the Middle East, London: Routledge, 1990, p. 41.
- Amnon Sella, Soviet Political and Military Conduct in the Middle East, London: Macmillan,
1978, pp. 78–9. - Korn, Stalemate, p. 189; emphasis added.
- Lebow and Stein, We All Lost, pp. 158, 452n44
- Ibid., pp. 160–3.
- David Kimche, The Last Option: After Nasser, Arafat and Saddam Hussein; The Quest for
Peace in the Middle East, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1991. However, as noted
about other studies, this is only an introductory chapter of a book devoted to a later period.
It is unsourced, and when we inquired in the early 2000s, the late Dr Kimche could state
only that this chapter was derived from the archive of his brother, the British journalist
Jon Kimche, who by then was deceased. But David Kimche himself, a former senior Mossad
operative and director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, undoubtedly based his assess-
ment also on his own experience. - In the author’s (Remez) personal experience, such releases were often dictated over the
phone directly to media newsrooms from the IDF spokeman’s office, beginning with such
formulas as “our military correspondent learned that ...” These semi-official communiqués
can be distinguished from the correspondents’ genuine contributions by the absence of
their names in the by-lines, as well as the identical text in various media. Likewise, reports
credited to an unnamed “Arab affairs correspondent” were routinely disseminated by MI’s
open-source unit “Hatzav”; “political correspondent” by the Prime Minister’s Office, etc. - Gerhard L. Weinberg, “Some Myths of World War II,” The 2011 George C. Marshall
Lecture in Military History, Journal of Military History, 75 ( July 2011), p. 707. - Even the IDF’s official history of the Yom Kippur War (Elchnan Oren’s The History of Yom
Kippur War, Tel Aviv: IDF History Department, 2013), lists the memoirs of Kissinger
and Nixon as its sole sources for “the impact of Détente,” the “expulsion of Soviet advis-
ers from Eg ypt,” the “feelers by Sadat toward the United States,” the San Clemente sum-
mit, etc.; p. 60n12. - To Brezhnev, in “Memorandum of Conversation,” Moscow, 13 September 1972, FRUS
N-XV, no. 44. - Aleksandr Kiknadze, Taynopis’: Sobytiya i nravy zashifrovannogo veka, Moscow: Sovetsky
Sport, 1998, p. 24. - See, e.g., Vitaly V. Naumkin et al. (eds), Blizhnevostochnyy konflikt, iz dokumentov arkh-
iva vnyeshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moscow: Materik, 2003, which was co-pub-
lished by Yale University Press as part of a series, “Russia in the 20th Century: Documents,”
but appeared only in Russian. For a particularly revealing example, see our analysis of doc-
ument 263, vol. 2, pp. 577–8, in Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, “Un-Finished Business:
Archival Evidence Exposes the Diplomatic Aspect of the USSR’s Pre-Planning for the Six-
Day War,”” Cold War History, 6, 3 (2006), pp. 377–95. - For example, the “Annals of Communism” series of Yale University Press.
- Rudolf Pikhoya, Sovetsky Soyuz: Istoriya Vlasti, 1945–1991, Novosibirsk: Sibirsky
Khronograf, 2000, p. 651.