NOTES
pp. [68–70]^
- Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, “Nonproliferation Treaty,” 17 May
1968, NSA, Impulse, no. 24. A year later, Kissinger reported to Nixon that Kosygin “asks
us to press the Germans and other countries allied with us (presumably meaning Japan
and, by Soviet definition, Israel)”—though Kosygin’s message did not name either one.
Kissinger to Nixon, 28 May 1969, FRUS N-XII, no. 51, emphasis added. - Savita Pande, The Future of NPT, New Delhi: Lancer, 1995, pp. 53–4.
- Primakov, Blizhniy Vostok, p. 342. His main evidence is the reported Israeli diversion of
uranium from the ship Scheersberg A in November 1968, but while this uranium was
bought in Belgium by an Israeli shell company based in Germany, not even the wildest
accounts have connected it with the German government. Primakov claims this purchase
was partly in exchange for Israeli supply of “laser technolog y for uranium enrichment,”
which rests on even slimmer Western evidence (Peter Vincent Pry, Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal,
Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984, p. 27). - Dishon et al., Middle East Record 1968, p. 32. State Department analysis concluded that
“although initially Soviets may have conceived of NPT as primarily [aimed at] controls
on FRG, [we] believe ... Soviets have come to develop a broader view ... Chicom nuclear
developments, ME war etc. surely had part.” State Department cable 107235 to US embassy,
Bonn, 30 January 1968, NSA, Impulse, no. 11. - Telegram from Department of State to embassy in Moscow, July 4, 1968. Months later,
the Soviet ambassador in London told Lord Sieff and Israeli official Yaacov Herzog, “pro
forma,” that Israel’s two “sins” were “threatening to blow up the Aswan Dam” and non-
accession to NPT, but voiced interest in maintaining contact anyway. [Aharon] Remez,
Israel ambassador, London, to Foreign Ministry, 20 December 1968. ISA HZ-4221/5. - FRUS J-XX, no. 315.
- Heikal, Road to Ramadan, pp. 74–5. He dates the visit shortly after the Libyan revolu-
tion, which began on 1 September 1969. - Shlomo Aronson, Nesheq gar’ini bamizrah hatikhon: Mi-Ben Gurion uve-hazara, Jerusalem:
Academon, 1995, vol. 2, pp. 124–6; quoted in Hersh, Samson Option, p. 177. - “Summary of the Situation and Issues,” attached to Kissinger to President, “Israeli Nuclear
Program,” 19 July 1969, pp. 1, 3, National Security Archive “Nuclear Vault,” http://nsar-
chive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb485/docs/Doc%2010%207-19-69%20circa.pdf - Shmu’el Segev, Ma’ariv, 26 July 1970, p. 9. In August 1970, shortly after the ceasefire on
the canal, the Soviet ambassador in Nepal warned his Israeli counterpart that “if Israel
does not withdraw and forces Eg ypt into another war, this might be an atomic war.”
M. Avgar, ambassador in Kathmandu, to Foreign Ministry, 17 August 1970, HZ-4604/5.
In November 1971, a Soviet diplomat in Vienna—the IAEA seat—attempted to contact
the Israeli embassy through local journalists for details of Israel’s atoms-for-peace activity,
purportedly in order to counter Eg yptian pressure for nuclear weapons. Israel rejected the
feeler. Y[itzhak] Patish, ambasador in Vienna, to Foreign Ministry, 24 November 1971,
ISA HZ-4604/7. - In December 1971, according to a newly arrived interpreter and liaison officer with the
Soviet top brass in Cairo, “Eg yptian military circles ... were insulted by the USSR’s refusal