NOTES
pp. [70–71]^
to give them so much as a single nuclear warhead, in order to put pressure on Israel.” Viktor
Borodin, interviewed in Andrey Chernitsyn, “Mirovaya ekspansiya,” Noril’sky Nikel’, 5,
36 (August–September 2007). But as the Eg yptians still had not received the only vehi-
cle they would ultimately have for such weapons—Scud missiles—this unique version
seems more like a rationale for the Soviets’ “expulsion” a few months later.- Vice-Admiral Nikolay Shashkov, formerly captain of K-172, interviewed in Nikolay
Cherkashin, “On dolzhen byl unichtozhit’ Izrail’,” Evreyskie Vesti (supplement of Golos
Ukrainy) (Kiev), 17–18 (September 1996), and quoted in Aleksandr Mosyakin, “Mesyats
Nisan,” Chas (Riga), 70, 489 (25 March 1999). - Although some Eg yptian figures have denied it, Syrian counterparts confirmed a similar
nuclear-umbrella arrangement with their country. Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence:
A Strateg y for the 1980s, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, pp. 68–9. - Gorbunov, “Napishi mne.”
- Ariel Levite and Emily Landau, Israel’s Nuclear Image: Arab Perceptions of Israel’s Nuclear
Posture, Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1994, pp. 42–3. See also Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb,
New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, pp. 289–90. - Foxbats, pp. 142–4.
- Large-scale maps in Russian that were produced by the Soviet Defense Ministry in the
late 1980s show the armistice line of 1949 as the border between Israel and the “Palestinian
Territories,” which are described as “occupied by Israel since 1967.” The 1947 partition
boundaries are not marked; http://www.finkel.tribune.co.il/IS_MAP_1987/index.html - CIA Intelligence Information Cable 49185, 14 February 1968.
- Transcript of Primakov–Eban conversation, 29 August 1971, ISA A-7037/17.
- Summary of talk between Primakov and unnamed Israeli official, apparently Hanan Baron,
30 August 1971, ISA A-7037/17. - Col. V. Larionov, “New Weapons and Strateg y,” translated in “Lt-Col. L. Merhav” (ed.),
Mahshava tzeva’it Sovietit ba-idan ha-gar’ini, Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1969, p. 41.
Heikal confirmed to Hersh (Samson Option, p. 235n**) that Soviet information about
Israel’s nuclear capability was “taken very seriously [but] had no impact on the overall
Eg yptian military operations.” - As P.R. Kumaraswamy concluded in 2000 (Revisiting the Yom Kippur War, London: Frank
Cass, 2000, p. 9), there is still no evidence to back converse speculation whereby Eg yptian
offensive plans were at any time after 1967 more ambitious (i.e., included an invasion of
Israel), but were scaled down because of Israeli nuclear deterrence or Soviet warnings
thereof. - Karen Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1984, p. 172. After the Soviet invasion, there were US speculations that “Japan and
the FRG probably would have signed ... except for the Czech events ... other nuclear-capa-
ble countries, which have been hanging back, such as Israel ... would presumably have
begun to feel isolated.” William C. Foster, director, US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, to Executive Secretary Benjamin H. Read, “Basic Issues Regarding NPT and
Timing of Ratification,” 22 November 1968, NSA, Impulse, no. 34. In the case of Israel at
least, this appears far-fetched. West Germany signed the NPT on 28 November 1969.