The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

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NOTES


pp. [143–146]^



  1. Rubinstein, Red Star, p. 107.

  2. Lt-Col. Aleksei Zhdanov, “Egipet 1969–70,” in Safonov et al., Grif, pp. 80, 97. Zhdanov,
    an engineer, had previously been sent to Eg ypt in 1964.

  3. Smirnov, “O podgotovke,” pp. 21–5.

  4. “Flight Log” for January 1970, IAF website, http://www.iaf.org.il/837-he/IAF.aspx

  5. Shalom, Phantoms, vol. 2, pp. 649–51, 725–6.

  6. Laqueur, Confrontation, p. 4. The anachronistic claim that Nasser’s trip to Moscow fol-
    lowed the Abu Zaabal raid apparently originated in Sadat’s 1971 speech at Tanta, when
    he also said that Nasser went despite being ill with the flu—a fabrication that will be dis-
    cussed below. By then, the Israeli press had accepted Nasser’s trip on 22 January as fact and
    Sadat was quoted only to explain the circumstances. Shmu’el Segev, Ma’ariv, 5 January
    1971, p. 2.

  7. “Further Background on the Kosygin Letter,” memorandum for the president from
    Kissinger, 6 February 1970. NARA, NSC files, country files, USSR, vol. VII, box 711.

  8. Serkov, Liniya fronta, p. 132. Vlasenko died in hospital on 30 January; NBC correspon-
    dent Wilson Hall, quoted in a NYT report, Ma’ariv, 30 January 1970, p. 1.

  9. Sadat’s aforementioned speech at Tanta, which was not witnessed by a single foreign cor-
    respondent. The initial version, distributed by MENA, was flashed worldwide as the first
    confirmation that Soviet personnel had manned Eg ypt’s air defense (Reuters, “Sadat
    Reveals Israeli Raid Killed 6 Soviet Missilemen,” NYT, 5 January 1971, p. 1). It quoted
    Sadat as referring to 28 January, when indeed Dahshur was struck in Priha-5. The attack-
    ing Phantom pilots reported evading missiles and scoring hits that caused massive explo-
    sions. Shalom, Phantoms, vol. 2, p. 629. This might account for the Soviet casualties men-
    tioned in more recently emerged sources as reported to Brezhnev on that day. See Chapter
    18, note 18.

  10. Unlike the other targets of Priha- 1 , the headquarters of the Eg yptian II Army Corps at
    Tel el-Kebir was only about 35 kilometers from the canal. Serkov, Liniya fronta, pp. 129–
    30, 132; Shalom, Phantoms, vol. 2, pp. 613, 625.

  11. Chapter 9, note 35. Serkov, Liniya fronta, p. 136; “Kniga Pamyati,” http://www.hubara-
    rus.ru/heroes.html. After this repeat attack, the II Army Corps HQ was pulled back to
    Kafr Abbas, closer to Cairo.

  12. Gorbunov, “Napishi mne.”

  13. Interviewed in Baranova, “Zashchitniki Otechestva.”

  14. Kryshtob, “I eta voyna byla by zavtra ...”

  15. Viktor Rogozhinsky, interviewed in “Kak nash zemlyak.”

  16. Presnukhin, interviewed in Gefele, “Napishi.”

  17. Amnon Sella, The Value of Human Life in Soviet Warfare. London: Routledge, 1992, p. i.

  18. The closest target that Israel reported that day was at Maadi, just across the Nile from Giza.
    This upscale district was described, however, as the quarters of “most of the foreign advis-
    ers,” and so was apparently where the 6th Division’s advisers were billeted. This would also
    explain Brezhnev and Grechko’s reference to “the advisers’ house.”

  19. The third fatality may refer either to the second attack or to the adviser who died in hos-

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