The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

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NOTES


pp. [283–284]^


brought to wide Western attention by Uri Ra’anan in testimony before a congressional
committee in March 1976 and in Uri Ra’anan, “The Soviet–Eg yptian ‘Rift,’” Commentary,
61, 6 ( June 1976), pp. 30–2. They were reproduced, and Ra’anan’s interpretation echoed,
both by journalists, e.g., NBC and Washington Post correspondent Alvin Rosenfeld (The
Plot to Destroy Israel, New York: Putnam, 1977, pp. 111–14), and scholars, e.g., Samuel
Katz (Battleground, updated edn, Tel Aviv: Steimatzky, 1985, pp. 217–21, http://www.
ourjerusalem.com/series/story/battleground040.html). Katz, like other right-wing Israeli
historians, retained this interpretation (“The Man with a Plan,” Jerusalem Post, 24 October
2003, http://www.saveisraelcampaign.com/atad/Articles.asp?article_id=1630). But when
the Eg yptian–Soviet rift after 1974 turned out not to have been a ruse, most mainstream
historiography gratuitously discarded this characterization of Sadat’s prewar moves as well.
In the most notable exception, David Kimche asserted that the “expulsion” was “done in
collusion with the Soviet Union” as a joint deception move, part of a strateg y developed
by Brezhnev himself (Last Option, p. 22).


  1. Il’inskaya, “Voyna prizrakov.”

  2. Murzintsev, Zapiski, p. 138; Vakhtin, “Simfonicheskiy kontsert.”

  3. But he also lashed out against US policy; the same day, Eg ypt reported exposing an
    American subversion plot. Reports by David Moshayov, Ehud Ya’ari and AP, Davar, 25 July
    1972, pp. 1–2.

  4. The agency noted that Sadat’s speech was “replete with references to firm US ... aid to
    Israel ... [which was] implemented ‘automatically and most enthusiastically and violently,’
    in contrast to the limited Soviet response to Eg ypt’s pleas ... the speech seemed primarily
    designed to salve some of the wounds in Moscow.” Central Intelligence Bulletin, “Arab
    States–Israel,” 25 July 1972, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_con-
    versions/1699355/1972–07–25.pdf

  5. Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 1276, 1295–6; emphasis added

  6. Sheehan, Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger, p. 22.

  7. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, p. 65.

  8. The never-solved murder of Israeli Air Attaché Col. Joe Allon in Washington in July 1973
    has been construed, most recently in an Israel TV “documentary,” as aimed to suppress his
    knowledge of a conspiracy between Sadat, Kissinger and Dayan to “allow Eg ypt a small
    victory.” No substantive evidence has ever been offered. Bar-Joseph, Ha’aretz, 12 April
    2011, http://www.Ha’aretz.co.il/opinions/1.1170857

  9. CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Soviet–Eg yptian Relations: An Uneasy Alliance,”
    no. 0847/72, 28 March 1972, p. 6.

  10. Aleksey Volovich, “Sovetskie voyska v Egipte,” Odesskie Izvestiya, 14 February 2013, http://
    izvestiya.odessa.ua/ru/2013/02/16/sovetskie-voyska-v-egipte. This Gen. Gorelov was a
    paratroop commander and not to be confused with the air force general who served in
    Eg ypt earlier.

  11. Vinogradov, Diplomatiya, pp. 220, 226–38; Kirpichenko, Razvedka, pp. 124–7; Ivanov,
    “Egipetskie kontrasty,” p. 184.

  12. Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 1297–8.

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