NOTES
pp. [322–324]^
- Golan, Decision Making, p. 145n12.
- Most sources put the agreement in May, as reported by Marwan on 20 May (Bar-Joseph,
Watchman, p. 147 and Angel, pp. 138, 201) and the delivery in July or August 1973. - AC, testimony of Albert Sudai, head of the political section, MI Eg yptian branch, p. 85.
- Golan, Decision Making, p. 1275n5.
- Ronen Bergman and Moshe Ronen, Yedi’ot Ahronot, 21 September 2012, pp. 4–6. The
note-taker was apparently Meir’s adjutant Yisra’el Li’or, who also told the AC that Zamir
repeated the report, including the nuclear warheads, to Meir on 21 September. This was
after questions were received from [sanitized]—presumably the CIA, which was still uncer-
tain—and the missiles’ presence was confirmed, “possibly” by aerial photography. Zamir
confessed he was surprised at this Soviet “escalation” at “this stage of their relations with
the Americans.” Most of the exchange with the other party is deleted; Li’or testimony,
pp. 13–20. The US identity of the “foreign intelligence” agency that was censored through-
out the AC papers is confirmed by one case where “the Americans” slipped through, on
p. 67. - Minutes of WSAG meeting, Washington, 6 October 1973, FRUS N-XXV, no. 103.
- Telegram from the Department of State to the embassy in Israel, 3 October 1973, FRUS
N-XXV, no. 95. - Protocol of the meeting of the Supreme Council of Syrian and Eg yptian forces, no. 6198,
29 August 1973, file no. 1, in Pernavsky, Arabo-Izrail’skie voyny, pp. 105–7. - Bregman and El-Tahri, Fifty Years War, pp. 116–17. Seale, Asad, pp. 193–4, mentions
only “a Soviet passenger liner on its regular run to Alexandria.” At the time, it was
announced only that on 2 July the Syrian foreign minister visited Cairo; Whetten, Canal
Wa r, p. 237, lists eighteen mutual visits between April and September 1973 but notes no
Soviet involvement. - Pernavsky, Arabo-Izrail’skie voyny, pp. 107–8.
- Oren, History, pp. 74–5, 635, citing the IDF History Department archive, holds that
Sadat and Assad “acted independently of the USSR,” and that the zero hour was deter-
mined only afterwards. - Dr Abdel Monem Said, “one of Eg ypt’s top national security experts,” told CBS after
Marwan’s death: “he was working for the security establishment of Eg ypt. ... He gave us a
number of hours before the Israelis started to mobilize ... and that was enough to make
the difference.” CBS News, “Was the Perfect Spy a Double Agent?,” 12 May 2009. - Golan, Decision Making, p. 145n12, quoting an MI document from September 1973.
- Bar-Joseph, Angel, p. 200.
- Zubok, Failed Empire, p. 238.
- AC, Tal testimony, Part 1, p. 6.
- AC, Elazar testimony, Part 1, p. 68. The commission’s report specifies the source of this
opinion as “Soviet experts” (APR, vol. 1, p. 77). Tal, in repeating his recollection, referred
to the sanitized identity of the Russian party “who convinced, or tried to convince” the
Syrians, in the singular, but later stated that the context was “a discussion or symposium,”
which corresponds with the Alexandria meeting (Tal testimony, Part 1, p. 9, and Part 3,
pp. 4–9). Yadin insisted that the original dispatch spoke of Soviet experts in general.