NOTES
pp. [329–332]^
- Sadat, In Search of Identity, p. 246.
- Vinogradov, Diplomatiya, p. 239.
- Akopov, transcript, p. 32.
- Sadat, In Search of Identity, p. 246; Seale, Asad, pp. 192–3.
- Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin, pp. 10–11.
- Ibid., pp. 4, 16.
- Parker, October War, p. 49.
- Zolotarev, Rossiya, p. 199.
- Lebow and Stein, We All Lost, pp. 165–166.
- Israelyan, “Inside the Kremlin”, pp. 2–3.
- Zolotarev et al., Rossiya, p. 199; Yaremenko, “Sovetsko-egipetskoe voennoe sotrudnich-
estvo,” p. 58, both citing an article in Vr e m y a M N, 5 October 1998. - Lebow and Stein, We All Lost, p. 163.
- Personal communication from Dr Yon Degen, June 2003.
- Marchenko, “General-Mayor VVS Vagin.”
- Akopov, transcript, pp. 31–32; Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin, p. 4.
- Goldstein and Zhukov, A Tale of Two Fleets, p. 44.
- AC, APR, pp. 25–6.
- Ibid., pp. 75–6, 124–6; Bergman and Meltzer, Yom Kippur War, p. 34. According to Ben-
Porat (Ne’il a, pp. 58–61), the first report was received about 4 p.m. on 4 October. In his
testimony to the AC (pp. 68, 106), he put the first intercept “in Russian” at 7 p.m., and
stated that the planes had left from various airports in the USSR, including Moscow and
Odessa, in what appeared to be intentional ostentation. First reports of the “aircraft head-
ing for the Middle East” came in around 10 p.m., and spoke of sixteen planes, including
six An-22s that did not appear in subsequent versions and could not be disguised as
civilian. - This was not challenged even by the AC. APR, p. 131.
- Ibid., pp. 78, 80, 126.
- Quandt, Peace Process, p. 150.
- Bergman and Meltzer, Yom Kippur War, pp. 31–2, 37. They put this intercept of an
Eg yptian signal at 11:00 on 5 October, by “Unit 848” at Umm-Hashiba. The Russian-
specialist unit Masregah had been disbanded after the “expulsion,” even though Soviet pol-
icy and intentions remained one of MI’s main gathering priorities for 1973–4 (document
quoted by Justice Agranat, AC, Eban testimony, Part 2, p. 70). A sigint department chief
at the time, Lt-Col. Shunia Pacht, has claimed that its monitors had dozens of intercepts
confirming that only the dependents of Soviet advisers and of “military personnel” were
leaving, but the monitors were reprimanded for inserting this clarification into a report
on 4 October, and the distinction was rejected. Roeim Malam (Intelligence Heritage
Center bulletin), 15 (October 2012), p. 7. - Memorandum from Quandt to Scowcroft, 6 October 1973, FRUS N-XXV, no. 99.
- Heikal, Road to Ramadan, pp. 6, 18.
- Herzog, War of Atonement, pp. 37–8. Herzog, a former chief of Israeli military intelli-