78 ADMINISTRATIVE ACnVITIES 1802-1812
especially by supporting the Poles against the Lithuanians in the region
of ViIna. 1 While this diplomacy is being pursued, Speransky continued
his argument, the economic policy of the Empire must be adjusted to
avoid the nation's bankruptcy. This means that Russia must continue
to export her main staples - mostly to England. True, such a course
would violate the Continental Blockade to which Alexander I had
adhered, out of necessity, at Tilsit. Yet, lest Russia be ruined econom-
ically, the risk of displeasing Napoleon has to be taken, even if it
brings war nearer. The best Russia can do to keep up the pretense of
abiding by the Continental System is to prohibit imports from
England.^2
The first departure from a strict interpretation of Russia's obliga-
tions under the Continental Blockade came in connection with the
lifting of the prohibition of grain exports from Odessa through the
Black Sea. Originally the prohibition had been motivated by the exis-
tence of a state of war with Turkey and the fear that the vessels might
fall into Turkish hands. But the closing of the Black Sea to Russian
exporters was undermining the prosperity of the southern landowners
and ruining the merchants of Odessa. The Governor of Odessa, Duke
de Richelieu, therefore, petitioned the Emperor to allow free grain
trade and, more specifically, to permit the export of this commodity
through Odessa. Richelieu argued that while the embargo was ruining
Russia, it did not harm the Turks in any way, for they could always be
supplied by the British whose navy controlled the Mediterranean.
Speransky and the Minister of Finance, Count Gur'ev, supported
Richelieu's argument and bolstered it by some theoretical considerations
- taken from Adam Smith - on the advantages of free trade. After
some hesitation, Alexander approved Richelieu's request and even
opened all Russian ports to free export of grain (PSZ 24,464,
December 19, 1810).3 This departure from the Continental System
was followed by a more sweeping measure: the tariff of 1810. This tariff
allowed almost complete freedom of export to Russian goods and per-
mitted the import of some essential manufactured products, while
keeping out luxury items. Almost overnight, after issuance of the tariff,
1 Speranskii, "0 vidakh frantsuzskogo pravitel'stva na Pol'shu," lac. cit., p. 440.
2 It is quite true that the Russian government was under strong pressure from
the nobility, whose economic interests were at stake, to keep open the trade with
England. But that pressure alone would not have swayed Alexander I if he himself
had not felt the wisdom of an active trade policy. Alexander, in spite of his
apparent "softness," was quite capable of disregarding his nobility's clamors when
he wished to, ~s he had proven during Tilsit, Erfurt, before Borodino, and also
later, after 1815.
3 Seredonin, lstoricheskii obzor deitel'nosti Komiteta Ministrov, I, pp. 143-145,149.