280 Emily Mackil
5.2.16–19). Thekoinon, furthermore, established institutions to facilitate access to the
varied but highly localized resources contained within its entire territory, granting all
citizensenktesis, the right to own property throughout thekoinon, rather than restrict-
ing such a right to the territory of their ownpolis, and granting rights of intermarriage
(epigamia) throughout thekoinon. The claim about regional property rights is probably
supported by a remarkable series of inscribed deeds of sale from cities in the region (Hat-
zopoulos 1998; Game 2008: nos. 13–35, 38, though neither makes the connection to
federal property rights as described by Xenophon). Regional property rights were also
granted within the Boeotian and Achaeankoina, and probably the Aetolian as well. This
had the effect of significantly increasing economic mobility within the region and, with it,
the variety of economic resources available to individuals. The logic of interdependence
was extended, certainly by the Hellenistic period if not before, when both the Achaean
and Boeotiankoinaundertook to protect limited local grain supplies from export during
periods of shortage (Migeotte 1984: no. 10 lines 4–6; Thür and Taeuber 1994: no. 18
lines 15–16). In the Hellenistic period, the Thessaliankoinon, too, was an instrument
for coordinating responses to requests for large exports of grain from this fertile region
(Garnsey, Gallant, and Rathbone 1984; Helly 2008: 87–91).
Pooling resources, however, practically invites predation and corruption, particularly
when resources are not uniformly distributed across a landscape. This was, presumably,
one of the fears of the Acanthians when they sent their ambassador to Sparta to ask
for help in resisting incorporation into thekoinonof the Chalcideis. Yet,koinawere
heavily involved in arbitrating disputes between memberpoleis, most of which arose
over resources and land (Harter-Uibopuu 1998 on Achaean arbitration). The detailed
account of Polybius shows us that when the Achaeankoinon, at least, seemed to take
from its member states without giving in return, it was held accountable by them
(e.g., Polybius 4.60.1–10). Ultimately,koinawere poor instruments for subordination
or imperialism, but excellent instruments for the coordination and cooperation of
multiplepoleis.
In addition to the acquisition of resources beyond the boundaries of the individual
polisand of theethnos, enhanced security was a major argument for participation in a
koinon. This was certainly the rationale behind Aratus’ move to incorporate Sicyon in
the Achaeankoinon: having just ousted a tyrant, the city needed powerful friends, or
at least a coalition of many friends who together represented a formidable challenge
to their opponents. The central importance of the provision of defense by thekoinon
is highlighted by a negative example from Hellenistic Achaea. Several western Achaean
poleissuffered repeated Aetolian invasions in 218 in the course of the Social War. When
the federal army failed to come to their defense, even after a specific request was sent,
they coordinated their refusal to pay their taxes to thekoinonand used the money to hire
a mercenary defense force instead (Polybius 4.60.1–10). The episode certainly shows
that increased security was one major reason whypoleisjoined akoinon.
Conclusion
When thepoleisandethn ̄eof mainland Greece were developing thekoinonas a new form
of state in the Classical period, they appealed to, and sometimes actively fostered, a sense