nadir shah and the afghans, 1732–47nature. The time lag in communications between Kabul and Calcutta, as
well as Burnes’s restrictive terms of reference, meant he was hamstrung
when it came to responding to unexpected and dramatic changes in the
military and political situation. Auckland’s choice of Burnes, a relatively
junior officer with little diplomatic experience, as head of a mission that
was always going to require delicate handling was another misjudgement.
In Masson’s words, the Governor General had confided in the discretion
of a man who had none. 53 Henry Pottinger, Sir John McNeill or John
Malcolm, all highly experienced diplomats with extensive experience of
Persia and Afghanistan, would have been far better choices.
Wade’s uncritical support of Ranjit Singh, his opposition to any British
mediation in the AfghanSikh War and his preference for the restoration of
Shah Shuja‘ further undermined Burnes’s position. In the end Wade’s view
prevailed, but had Britain used its good offices to resolve the longstanding
dispute, rather than demand what was in effect Dost Muhammad’s uncon
ditional surrender, the evidence suggests that both sides would have been
more than willing to accept a compromise solution. Had this been achieved
British prestige would have been significantly enhanced both in Kabul and
Lahore and saved thousands of British, Indian and Afghan lives, for the fail
ure of the Burnes Mission led to war with Afghanistan. The fallout from the
failure of the mission, though, was much longer lasting. It undid the good
will created by the Elphinstone Mission and seriously damaged Britain’s
image with successive rulers of Afghanistan who no longer trusted British
diplomacy, which they regarded as devious, duplicitous and deceptive – a
belief that endured well into the twentieth century.
When Burnes reached Peshawar, he informed Wade that he was
convinced that ‘consequences of a most serious nature’ would result ‘unless
the British government applies a prompt, active, and decided counter action’
to oppose Russia. Auckland too was convinced that Britain ‘ought not to
suffer Persian and Russian influence quietly to fix themselves along our
entire western frontier’. 54 In May 1838 Auckland called a council of war
in Simla, which decided on military intervention against both Persia and
Afghanistan. Vitkevich’s mission, which the Governor General had previ
ously dismissed as insignificant, was now seen to pose a direct threat to
British interests and Wade’s plan to restore Shah Shuja‘, which Auckland had
rejected a few months before, was adopted as official policy. Macnaghten,
Auckland’s chief political secretary, was sent to meet Ranjit Singh to discuss
a military alliance against Afghanistan and a new treaty. Macnaghten was
also entrusted with the planning of the military campaign and a few months
later he was appointed Envoy Plenipotentiary to the court of Shah Shuja‘.