a house divided, 1933–73accept. Within a matter of weeks after Da’ud’s coup, Afghanistan’s relations
with Pakistan were once more on a knife-edge.
At the end of August 1973 Neumann, who was about to leave at the
end of his tour of duty, decided to use ‘shock treatment’ over the state of
governance and the Pushtunistan issue, since it was ‘better to let a depart-
ing ambassador say some unpleasant truths than [an] incoming one’. 12
In his final official meeting with Da’ud, Neumann gave the President
what he described as a ‘cold shower’, informing him that Washington
viewed his alliance with the pdpa unfavourably and warning him that the
Communists posed a threat to Afghanistan’s independence and sover-
eignty. He reiterated America’s opposition to the President’s Pushtunistan
policy and bluntly told him that Afghanistan risked a war with Pakistan.
Da’ud, however, ignored Neumann’s warnings and continued the war of
words. At the end of 1973, frustrated State Department officials noted that
the situation was moving ‘slowly, steadily and perhaps inexorably towards
confrontation’. 13
President Da’ud’s purges and the Islamist insurgencyA month or so after his meeting with Neumann, Da’ud began the first of
a series of purges. His first target was dynastic rivals, members of previ-
ous administrations and supporters of the Liberal Parliament. Hashim
Maiwandwal, Khan Muhammad Khan, who had been Minister of Defence
in ‘Etimadi’s administration, and two former Chiefs of Staff of the army
and air force, along with some sixty other individuals, were accused of
planning a coup and arrested. The alleged ringleaders were handed over
to Parchami internal security officers who beat them, tore out their finger-
nails and subjected them to electric shocks. The torture was too much
for Maiwandwal, who died from his injuries, though officially it was
announced he had committed suicide. As for Khan Muhammad Khan,
Da’ud had him beaten in his presence. 14 The government laid the blame
for the alleged coup on the usa and Pakistan. When challenged by the
ambassadors in question, Na‘im claimed the government had documen-
tary proof for the allegation, but no such evidence was ever forthcoming.
The outcome was that Afghanistan’s relations with the usa and Pakistan
deteriorated even further.
Da’ud exploited the coup as justification for purging Islamist critics of
his government. On 5 December 1973 Radio Kabul broadcast a confession
purportedly written by Khan Muhammad Khan in which he claimed the
conspirators planned to ‘utilize religious leaderships, military units... and