quicklymovingseatargets,especiallyinthecaseofalanding,directaimingatthetargets
shouldbefeasible.”¹²⁵AnotherformerKriegsmarineadmiralalsoaccusedtheWehrmachtofdisregard-
ingobviouslessonsfromtheDardanellescampaign:
“ThecircumstancesofcombatattheDardanelleswerecompletelydifferentfromtheland-
ingbattlesofWorldWarTwo,andtheywereofnouseasanexperiencebasisforthelatter.
Themajorpositiveexperience[fromGallipoli],thatlandingshadtobeopposedbyopera-
tivearmyforces,wasnotpartofthenavy’sevaluationareaofresponsibility.Itwasnotcon-
sideredsufficientlybytheGermanWehrmachtundertheconstraintsofwar.”¹²⁶AttheNormandyshorestheGermanNavyfacedtheproblemthattheenemyfleet
haddrawntheirlessonsoutofthe“primitive-naiveconductoftheAlliedshipsin
frontoftheDardanelles”.¹²⁷In 1944 theAlliesmadeuseofsmokescreensand
deceptiontacticstointerferewiththeGermanradiorangingtechnique.Similarly
totheWehrmacht,theKriegsmarinealsodrewthewrongconclusionsfromthe
Gallipolicampaign.The Wehrmacht criticizedtheimmobile navycommand
andartillerypostsinthefirstlineofdefense,sinceforthem,“[...]theNavybe-
lieveditselfonboardawarshiponthehighseas[...]”trustingtheirheavilyarmed
bunkers.¹²⁸TheKriegsmarinedefenceplangenerated“[t]hebeliefthatthecon-
cretefenceallaroundthecoastwouldpreventanyonefromlandingonit.”¹²⁹
IntheendboththeWehrmachtandtheKriegsmarinewerewrongintheir
assumptions.Alliedairsuperiorityhadmadeaflexibledefensedifficultand
theGermanreservesarrivedtoolateintheinvasionarea.TheKriegsmarine
bunkersfailedtorepeltheAlliednavallandingsandproveduselesswhenat-
tackedfromtherearbycommandounitsandparatroopers.
ItalsohastobestatedthatneitherontheAlliednorontheGermansidethe
experiencesofGallipolihadbeenthemaindrivingforcebehindthedevelopment
ofamoderndoctrine.Itwasratheracombinationofwartimeandinterwarex-
periences¹³⁰,includingwronginterpretationsoftheGallipolicampaignbythe
TheodorKrancke,NavalGroupWestinDefenseagainsttheAlliedLanding;ofHistoricaland
TechnicalInterest,USNARAHDB- 16 9, 1946 ,9– 10.
WilhelmvonHarnier,“KüstenartillerieundAtlantikwall,”Marine-Rundschau 52 – 4(1955),
91 – 92.
vonHarnier,“KüstenartillerieundAtlantikwall,” 92.
Gersdorff,CritiqueoftheDefenseagainstInvasion,10.
GüntherBlumentritt,EffectofFortificationsonStrategicPlanning,USNARAHDB- 65 2, 194 7,
33.
Speller,“IntheShadowofGallipoli,” 14 8.
DisprovaloftheGermanDoctrineduringthe‘ThelongestDay’ 189