time.¹⁸⁶ThesamewastruefortheFrenchoccupationforceinSyria.However,the
Westernborderwasthemainlineofdefence.Asaconsequenceoftheinsuffi-
cientwartimesupplysystemoftheOttomanarmy,severalmilitaryfactories
wereestablishedandcooperationwithmainlyGermancompanieswassought
inordertopreparetheTurkisharmyfortotalwar.¹⁸⁷
Intheearlyrepublic,theTurkisharmedforcesservedthreemainfunctions.
Firstofall,theywereneededtosupportandsustaindomesticsecurity.Theup-
risingsinTurkeybecameatestinggroundforthestrengthofthenewarmy.In
1925 alone,morethanhalfoftheTurkishforcesweremobilizedagainstthere-
bellionofSheikhSait,muchmorethaninthecaseoftheReichswehrdeployment
inSaxonyin1 92 3.Thisbeingthecase,botharmiesplayedanimportantroledur-
ingthestateofemergencyintheirrespectivecountries.¹⁸⁸
Secondly,theTurkisharmywaspartoftheeducationsystem.Illiteratere-
cruitsweretaughttoreadandwriteandreceivedcoursesinbasicmathematics
andthefundamentalsofhealthcare.Recruitsfromruralareaswereinstructedin
animalcareandagriculture.Allrecruitswereindoctrinatedwithrepublican
principlesduringciviccourses.¹⁸⁹Whenoutliningthispolicy,PresidentMustafa
KemalprovidedaninterestingreferencetoGermanyin1 92 3:
“[...][T]hiscountryistwicethesizeofGermany.InGermanythereare79millioninhabi-
tants.Wehaveeightmillion.Inthiscountrytheinhabitantsdonotdiefromhungerbut
theonly[thing]thatiskillingthesepeopleisignorance.[...][Therefore]themilitary[serv-
ice]hastobekindofaschoolsothat[theconscript]willlearnboth,themilitaryartofde-
fendingthefatherlandaswellasadvantageousthingsforthewholevillageandthevillag-
ersandhisownlife.”¹⁹⁰WecanclearlystatethateventhoughthealliancewithGermanywasperceived
criticallybytheTurkishheadofstate,theGermanrolemodelofastrongnation
remainedvalid.Assuch,itcouldevenserveasakindofstimulusfortheTurkish
SeetheItalianviewinMariaGabriellaPasqualini,L’EsercitoItalianonelDodecaneso1 912 –
1943 .SperanzeeRealtà:Idocumentidell’UfficioStoricodelloStatoMaggioredell’Esercito(Rome:
StatoMaggioredell’Esercito,UfficioStorico,2005), 201 – 408.
Tekeliandİlkin,İkinciDünyaSavaşıTürkiyesi,78, 80 ,82, 104 ,1 05.
Tekeliandİlkin,İkinciDünyaSavaşıTürkiyesi,93and112;cf.the 1924 Reichswehrmemo-
randumonthestateofemergencyinHeinzHürten,DasKrisenjahr1 92 3:MilitärundInnenpolitik,
1922 – 1924 (Düsseldorf:Droste,1980), 334 – 36 2.
DoğanAkyaz,AskerîMüdahalelerinOrduyaEtkisi:HiyerarşiDışıÖrgütlenmedenEmirKomu-
taZincirine[TheInfluenceofMilitaryInterventionsontheArmy:FromOrganizingOutsidethe
HierarchytotheChainofCommand](Istanbul:İletişimYayınları,2 00 2),35.
İnan,GaziMustafaKemalAtatürk’ün 1923 Eskişehir-İzmitKonuşmaları,54;Ibid.asimilar
referencetoGermanyonp.1 10.
TheStatusoftheTurkishArmyafter 1923 203