wasinasimilargeographicalpositionandhadalreadyoncefacedatwo-front
warin 1877 /78.FortheOttomanofficercorps,thesimilaritiesoftheirmilitarysit-
uationwiththeGermancasewereevident.However,theOttomanswerenoten-
tirelycorrectintheirassumptions.TheGermanwarfarewasbasedonawellde-
velopedroadandrailwaynetworkandplannedoperationsduetotheCentral
EuropeanmoderateclimateformedthebasisoftheGermangrandstrategy.⁶
ThelackofthisprerequisitebecameevidentintheOttomantheatersofwarbe-
tween 1912 and1918.
ButwhydidtheOttomansideprefertheʻGermanwayofwar’andleaveaside
theFrenchmodelthathadservedasthemainsourceofinspirationsincethe
18thcentury?TheGermancasewashighlyattractivetomostoftheOttomanmili-
taryleadership.ThiswasespeciallyvalidfortheworkofthePrussianGeneral
Staff.Theapplicationoflessonsfrompastcampaigns
“madePrussianreactiontotheexperienceofwarsomuchmorerapid,rational,andthor-
oughthananythingotherEuropeanarmiesweretoachieve.[...]By1 871 ,therefore,thePrus-
sianshadtwicedemonstratedhowtowinawaragainstagreatpowerinjigtime.Ithad
takenthemjustthreeweekstodefeattheAustriansandonlysixweekstocaptureNapoleon
III.ItwasimpossiblenottoprefersuchamodeltothebumblingagonyoftheAmerican
CivilWarortheyear-longstandstillatSevastopol.Prussianmilitaryprestigerocketedac-
cordingly.”⁷
Besidesitsoperationalappeal,theGermanmilitaryplayedapoliticalroleinthe
society.Whatdoesthereforeraisethequestionofwhatkindofmilitarysystem
theGermansidewantedtoconveytotheOttomanlands,andinhowfartheGer-
manophilepartsoftheOttomanofficercorpswillinglyappropriatedthem.The
emphasisofthemilitaryclasswithintheGermansocietywasnothingtobeover-
seeneasilyanditwasalsothetargetofconsiderablenationalcriticism.Some
featuresofWilhelmineGermany’smilitarycouldalsobedetectedintheOttoman
andlaterTurkisharmedforces:
“[T]hearmyhadbecomeastatewithinthestate,claimingtherighttodefinewhatwas,or
wasnot,tothenationalinterestandtodispensewiththosewhodidnotagreewiththedef-
inition[...],claimedimmunitytothelawthatgovernedtherestofthenationand[...]asig-
nificantpartoftheofficercorpslookeduponciviliansocietywithamixtureofcontempt
Citino,TheGermanWayofWar,2 005 ,XV.
WilliamHardyMcNeill,ThePursuitofPower:Technology,ArmedForce,andSocietysinceA.D.
1000 (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress, 198 2),2 52 – 25 3.
28 2ThePeakofKnowledgeTransfer