172 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
pronouncements. He pledged his faith in the Strategic Defense Initia-
tive, but this time he said he wanted to render it less worrisome to its
adversaries. He had it in mind for America to hand the completed
research over to the United Nations, which could then deploy it against
any power that threatened to use nuclear weapons. This was heady
stuff. It was also somewhat confusing because he simultaneously
emphasized the need to go on pressurizing Gorbachëv. He stated that if
the USSR intended to keep intermediate-range missiles in its Asian
provinces, he would feel free to install equivalent weapons in Alaska.^22
Next day, on 4 February 1986, the President signed National Secu-
rity Decision Directive no. 210 setting out his considered objectives.
He reaffirmed his personal commitment to the total abolition of
nuclear missiles; but he rejected Gorbachëv’s declaration and put for-
ward his own standpoint at the Geneva summit as the best basis for
discussions with the USSR. He called for a renewal of negotiations. In
doing this, he signalled a preference for Shultz over Weinberger and
Casey. Reagan wanted to aim at an immediate halving of the number
of Soviet and American missiles, but only if the Americans could
secure a fair underpinning for computation and a reliable system to
verify compliance. This would open the way to scrapping the nuclear
missiles of Britain, France and China. The President endorsed the goal
of scrapping all intermediate-range nuclear warheads without delay.^23
His eagerness for total nuclear disarmament was genuine, and his
directive was rather more hostile about Gorbachëv than he really
felt. In private he was willing to say that he detected ‘something of a
chemistry’ between the two of them, and he warmly remembered how
the General Secretary had cited a verse from the Bible in their meet-
ings in Geneva.^24
On 16 February 1986 he sent an encouraging letter to Gorbachëv
with some proposals to reduce the nuclear stockpiles. He promised to
respond to his January declaration as soon as the American adminis-
tration completed its examination. He indicated a continuing concern
about regional conflicts, stressing that ‘the Soviet Union is engaged
in a war in another country and the United States is not’. He offered
cooperation ‘in every reasonable way’ if Gorbachëv would withdraw
his forces from Afghanistan. He commented that Moscow’s support
for Libyan dictator Gaddafi left him sceptical about the USSR’s desire
to put an end to terrorism.^25
Indeed, the Americans had credible information that the USSR
was deploying new mobile intercontinental missiles – the SS-25s.