174 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
arsenals of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Shultz
admitted that the Soviet leadership still objected to American policy
on British and French missiles and on the removal of all such missiles
from Asia; but he urged that Reagan should seize the initiative by test-
ing out Gorbachëv’s sincerity in offering to negotiate.^30 This was also
the opinion of Soviet specialists elsewhere in the administration. The
National Security Council’s Jack Matlock, while agreeing that Gor-
bachëv had fumbled his move in January, wanted to raise the tempo.^31
Ambassador Hartman in Moscow was also eager for a resumption of
talks.^32
Reagan liked what he heard and signed a directive with the idea of
exploring whether Soviet leaders would agree to reducing nuclear
stockpiles on the basis of his own proposals.^33 On 22 February 1986 he
wrote to Gorbachëv suggesting that the first stage of disarmament
should involve a reduction of the strategic missiles of each superpower
to 4,500. He proposed to get rid of all intermediate-range missiles by
the end of 1989. He offered to keep research on strategic defence
within the bounds of current treaty obligations. He called for ‘concrete
and meaningful confidence-building measures’ and for a total ban on
chemical weapons. While he was unspecific on the timing and sub-
stance of subsequent stages, he expressed the hope that he and
Gorbachëv could push things forward before meeting again.^34
The White House and State Department needed consent inside
NATO before conducting further negotiations with Gorbachëv.
Reagan chose Nitze and Rowny as his emissaries. Nitze had a busy
time in Western Europe, visiting London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, The
Hague and Brussels – he reported that allied leaders remained suspi-
cious about Soviet motives.^35 Nevertheless they were pleased that the
President hoped to go on talking to the General Secretary, and they
wanted him to keep squeezing concessions out of Moscow. Their fear
was that if the January declaration were ever implemented, the Ameri-
cans would fold away the nuclear umbrella that had protected them
in the post-war decades. Such an outcome would expose Western
Europe to the menace of the USSR’s massive conventional forces.
While Nitze was dealing with the NATO allies, Rowny set off on a tour
of America’s allied and friendly countries in the East; the trip covered
Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing and Canberra. His summary report highlighted
the suspicions about Gorbachëv. Leaders in that part of the world
had not failed to notice that the Soviet proposals lacked the urgency
about denuclearization in Asia that they showed about Europe.^36