AMERICAN REJECTION 177Shultz put forward some ideas on how to reduce Soviet meddling in
regional trouble spots. Gorbachëv had indicated his wish to change
policy on Afghanistan, and Shultz called for the preparation of a peace
plan involving the withdrawal of the USSR’s forces over a six-month
period. But if Gorbachëv desired to stay on good terms with America,
he would also have to impel his Vietnamese allies to pull out of Cam-
bodia. America should be willing to assist with Cambodian economic
reconstruction and to normalize its links with Vietnam. In regard to
Angola, Shultz placed his emphasis on deterring the Soviet leadership
from escalating its military intervention. He aimed to deal with the
Nicaraguan question by offering to resume dialogue with the Sandini-
stas. He doubted that Gorbachëv wished to come to an understanding
about Central America. But if Soviet supplies of armaments contin-
ued, the Americans should feel free to approach the American
Congress for funds to assist the armed opposition to Nicaragua’s
Sandinista government.^49
Shultz liked to ventilate these arguments whenever he met
Shevardnadze and to ensure that the Politburo understood the inten-
sity of America’s determination.^50 He wished to test out the sincerity
of Gorbachëv’s peace offensive. The January declaration had proposed
a three-stage process of total nuclear disarmament. Gorbachëv –
or rather Akhromeev – had knowingly reserved several important
measures for the third and last stage. The Americans concluded that
the intention was to extract the maximum advantage for the USSR
while delaying concessions that were on America’s list of demands.
Shultz intended to insist on bringing these measures forward to the
first stage of the process. If Gorbachëv withheld his consent, Shultz
could expose his disingenuousness before world public opinion. He
told Assistant Defense Secretary Perle about his ideas with a view to
building a coalition inside the administration. Perle warmed to what
he heard, and he and Shultz decided that they could work together in
discovering an answer to the question: was Gorbachëv truly willing to
come to terms with America in the interests of global peace?^51 Things
were changing on the American side. Shultz usually wanted to find a
way to bring the Soviet leadership into serious talks. This was the first
time that he had persuaded one of the sceptics. The hope glimmered
in his mind that the chronic factionalism could be surmounted.