THE STALLED INTERACTION 181ignored the topic, they could easily give the impression of being
unable to match America’s military modernization. The General
Secretary opted for a middle course. He spoke less often about
the Initiative; and when he mentioned it, he avoided apocalyptic
language.^12
He assured the Politburo that he would make no undue compro-
mise. Soviet scientists, he claimed, were confident about the situation.
They had told him that ‘a system can be created to annihilate the
Strategic Defense Initiative stations’. But peace was infinitely preferable
to war. He recognized that any conflict with America involving nuclear
weapons could only end in the destruction of the defence systems of
both sides – and, he added, the existence of ‘our state’ would be put
into question.^13 He would not let Reagan bully him. He told aides that
the same scientists reckoned that the USSR could build a counter-
system at a tenth of the cost of America’s Strategic Defense Initiative.
He would do ‘everything to avoid further wrecking the country
through defence’.^14 He was pleased that his new course in foreign
policy had dispelled a lot of the fear about the Soviet Union abroad.
The impact was gratifyingly effective in the US, where public opinion
gave him the benefit of the doubt and sidelined the political right.^15 At
the Politburo on 3 April 1986 he displayed a cautious optimism: ‘It’s
become more difficult for Reagan as a consequence of our policy. The
USA wants to halt our peace offensive, to break it up. All their actions
are aimed at provoking us. We can see what they want: to succeed by
their steps to break up the process of growth of our authority.’^16
He told the Politburo: ‘We live on a single planet. We cannot keep
the peace without America.’^17 Writing to the President on 2 April 1986,
he grumbled about the American inaction. He asked why the White
House had refused to do anything about his January declaration.
Gorbachëv denied that he was merely making propaganda.^18 When
talking in public, he avoided a severe public critique of the American
admini stration. In the big speech he gave in Tolyatti on 9 April, he was
curt but respectful. He could not afford to bait Reagan and Shultz
while he worked to resume the ‘Geneva process’ and achieve a second
summit meeting.^19
His experiences abroad in 1984–1985 had pushed him towards
some conclusions about Western Europe. Britain, he said, was likely
to remain ‘the key power in European affairs’. He did not explain why
he thought so; but at a time when the British economy was hardly
the continent’s powerhouse, it may be that he was thinking about