182 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Thatcher’s links to the White House. British communist leader Gordon
McLennan and several Labour Party politicians had urged him to try
and prise her Conservative government free from its entanglement
with the Americans. Gorbachëv limited himself to commenting that
the Labour Party might return to power within a couple of years.^20
Meanwhile Thatcher entirely failed to follow up her congenial encoun-
ter with him before he became General Secretary. She was wary of
becoming entangled with him. If Gorbachëv felt disappointed in her,
he refrained from saying so. But he no more knew what to do about
her than she did about him – and really it would have been easier for
him than for her to break the ice. She bided her time and ignored the
criticism of those who urged the case for an overture to Moscow.
Gorbachëv wanted to hold his choices open: ‘We also mustn’t
forget Lenin’s instructions about the importance of rapprochement
between Germany and Russia.’ Honecker remained difficult to control
on the ‘German–German question’, and Gorbachëv wanted to keep
watch over his contacts with West Germany. He recognized the
need to take seriously the question of German reunification. Soviet
interests lay in preventing the re-emergence of ‘Bismarcks and Hitlers’,
and Gorbachëv meant to take academic advice on the subject.^21 By
liaising with Chancellor Kohl, he hoped to prevent East Germany
from falling under West German dominance. It would also do no
harm if a rapprochement between Moscow and Bonn were to put the
Americans somewhat on edge. Tokyo and Beijing could be treated
in the same fashion. At the same time Gorbachëv plotted to keep Kohl
on his toes by strengthening ties with Italy. The Kremlin had to
manoeuvre deftly – and Gorbachëv asked the Party International
Department to improve its practical advice. Although he knew that
West European leaders were never going to break with Washington, he
was aware of the support he enjoyed among socialist parties, the
labour movement and ‘other progressive forces’, and he aimed to
strengthen his appeal to Western businessmen, clerics, trade unionists
and even soldiers: the idea was that if he could convince such people
about his sincerity, governments everywhere would soon have to
listen.^22
As he pondered what to do about the Americans, he recognized
his mistake in omitting the question of conventional weapons from his
January declaration: ‘We’re ready to resolve this question too. We are
for balance in all types of armaments, including conventional ones.’^23
He anticipated all manner of objections from the military leadership.