204 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
radical in revising foreign policy, and he disdained to let others suffer
as the result of following his lead. Instead he went to Gorbachëv and
repeated the arguments for new procedures of notification and verifi-
cation. Gorbachëv rejected the charges against Grinevski.^38
Akhromeev told Grinevski that many of the Soviet Army’s divi-
sions east of the Volga were under strength in troops and equipment:
‘We cannot let foreigners see all that shame.’ Grinevski retorted that
he, as a patriot, welcomed inspections as a way of reducing the number
of divisions and ensuring that the remainder were properly supplied.^39
The Politburo met on 7 August 1986 to listen to their opposing
submissions. When Grinevski said that inspections would enable the
USSR to discover crucial information about American forces, Akhro-
meev turned red with anger and accused Grinevski of treason.^40
Gorbachëv had heard quite enough: ‘Well, what have we here? You are
Chief of the General Staff. Now go and take the measures to put the
army in order so that there won’t be any need to invite the Americans
to bring about order in our army.’^41 He reminded Akhromeev that it
was the political leaders and not the military commanders who took
the ultimate decisions – and he told him to stick to his proper sphere
of duties. The Politburo agreed and there was no need for a show of
hands. As he left the meeting, Akhromeev shouted over at Grinevski:
‘The armed forces will never, never, never forgive you for this!’^42 That
evening Grinevski got his own back by persuading Shevardnadze to
arrange for Akhromeev to go to Stockholm and speak in favour of a
regime of inspections. The Americans would be impressed if a Soviet
marshal expressed vocal support. The Politburo endorsed the idea.^43
Although Akhromeev travelled to Sweden in a foul temper, he per-
formed his duties conscientiously and the American delegation
reported warmly on him to Washington.^44
The thread that still tied Akhromeev to Gorbachëv was the Polit-
buro’s commitment to the idea that there would be no nuclear arms
agreement unless America assented to Soviet terms about the Strategic
Defense Initiative.^45 Akhromeev, despite his authorship of the first
variant of the January declaration, had always been sceptical about
the chances of an arms reduction treaty. He probably calculated that
the Americans were unlikely to accept the compromise that Gor-
bachëv was now proposing. He was willing to wait and see how
Reagan would react.
A new difficulty arose between Washington and Moscow on 2 Sep-
tember 1986 when the Soviet authorities arrested Nicholas Daniloff,