THE LOST SUMMER 203a very frustrating environment to work in. I find it difficult to pull
together a team in the security field. It’s a debilitating situation. Con-
stantly under attack. I get no sense of support. I feel I’m out there
operating on my own. Maybe somebody else can do it better.’ Regan
impressed on Shultz that big ‘games’ were imminent in the inter-
national arena. The White House needed a united cabinet with ‘no
deviating, no undercutting, no sniping’. Regan added that the Presi-
dent would have to ‘bang heads’. Shultz knew all this. Indeed it was
because he doubted that Reagan would ever act with the necessary
firmness that he had decided to resign. But he relented, agreeing to
talk again in a few days; and on returning to Washington, he withdrew
his letter and readied himself for the next phase in the struggle.^33
On 16 August 1986 Reagan signed a directive to guide the Ameri-
can delegation when the scheduled talks reopened in Geneva. The
negotiators were to emphasize America’s right to carry out research,
construction and testing of the Defense Initiative. Reagan was hoping
to deploy the programme from 1991; he wanted to repeat the promise
to share the technology with the Soviet Union.^34 In yet another direc-
tive, he stressed that his ‘grand strategy’ was to avoid nuclear war
while preventing the expansion of Soviet global power. Deterrence was
to stay at the centre of policy. It would remain in the American interest
to thwart a rapprochement between China and the USSR. The mod-
ernization of its strategic nuclear forces should be a priority while
intensive work continued on the Strategic Defense Initiative.^35
Meanwhile Gorbachëv was squeezing fresh concessions out of his
General Staff after Grinevski pointed to the weight that America gave
to the need for an agreed process of notification and verification about
large-scale troop movements in Europe. Gorbachëv gave his approval.
He told Zaikov and Akhromeev to work out suitable guidelines.
Akhromeev quietly declined to obey, and there was a fractious atmo-
sphere at the following meeting of the Zaikov Commission on 21 June
- Shevardnadze, Politburo member and minister, heatedly argued
that the American demands were harmless enough. Akhromeev’s
resistance collapsed that same day.^36 Yet the General Staff and KGB
continued to dread the idea of America’s inspectors snooping on the
USSR’s military facilities.^37 They accused Grinevski of straying outside
the bounds of his instructions. Defence Minister Sokolov called for the
Party Control Committee to investigate the matter. Grinevski admit-
ted to Shevardnadze that in some technical respects he had overstepped
directives. Shevardnadze himself had encouraged his ministry to be