SUMMIT IN REYKJAVIK 211immediately phoned the State Department with the information.^11
Shevardnadze told the Canadians that Gorbachëv would bring some
‘compromise variants’ with him to Iceland.^12 This only served to per-
suade the Americans that the General Secretary was cooking up some
mischief and that the President and his travelling party would need
to stay very alert. Poindexter assumed that Gorbachëv would try to
‘unravel the Western consensus on tougher policies towards the Soviet
Union’. Gorbachëv had implied some willingness to drop the question
of British and French nuclear stockpiles from talks with the Ameri-
cans. Perhaps he would also change his stance still further on the
Strategic Defense Initiative. Reagan’s officials were divided whenever
they discussed the possible outcomes.^13 Gorbachëv was gaining a
psychological edge before the encounter in Iceland, and concern
spread on the American side that he might get the better of the
President.
The American agitation was understandable. The General Secre-
tary infringed the etiquette of summits by which each side forewarned
the other about its agenda. He thought he had a distinct chance of
influencing Reagan through his own ideas and personality – the very
thing that American right-wingers feared. As he saw it, Reagan in their
confidential correspondence eschewed the kind of anticommunist
rhetoric that he used in public.^14 Reagan himself was wary about pos-
sible criticism by his own conservative associates and supporters. He
forbade officials to speak to the media without his consent – he
planned to avoid any repetition of the mischief that Weinberger had
wrought before the Geneva summit. On 7 October the President held
a preparatory discussion at the National Security Planning Group with
Weinberger and Casey in attendance.^15 Neither of them would be
going to Iceland. Reagan intended to take charge with Shultz and only
a small team at his side. He also wanted to strike a businesslike tone,
and there would be only a minimum of social activities. Reagan
doused any high hopes about the meeting. While hoping for a con-
structive dialogue, he did not expect to be signing an agreement in
Iceland.^16
On 9 October the Soviet and American delegations flew into
Keflavik airport. The Icelandic navy prevented the Greenpeace vessel
Sirius from entering Reykjavik harbour where, at Chebrikov’s instiga-
tion, Gorbachëv and his people based themselves on two Soviet ships
including passenger liner Georgi Ots. This was a precaution against
being bugged.^17 Reagan stayed in the US Ambassador’s residence while