THE OTHER CONTINENT: ASIA 381USSR’s alliance with Vietnam was anyway becoming a troubled one.
The Vietnamese leaders objected when Shevardnadze mooted the pos-
sibility of visiting Cambodia; they disliked any hint of an idea that
they alone were not going to dominate the settlement of the Cam-
bodian question.^17 Gorbachëv resolved upon an entente with China,
albeit without giving the impression of desiring it at all costs.^18 This
would involve concessions by the USSR. Gorbachëv told the Politburo
on 8 May 1987 about the difficulties as he saw them. He stressed that
nothing could be achieved until the Chinese leadership felt ready.
Moscow had made the first conciliatory approach: it was up to Beijing
to respond. In the meantime he wanted to do nothing that would
‘frighten’ America.^19
The Kremlin’s steady protestations of goodwill eventually secured
an invitation for Shevardnadze to visit Beijing and Shanghai. On 3
February 1989 Shevardnadze met Prime Minister Li in the Chinese
capital and tried to draw a line under past troubles. Li agreed on the
goal of ‘normalization’ and expressed appreciation for what Gorbachëv
had done for peace around the world. There was agreement that Gor-
bachëv too should come to China, but Li stipulated that this should
take place without the kind of excitement that greeted him elsewhere.
The Chinese leadership warned against any kind of political disturb-
ance. Li baulked at the idea of issuing a joint communiqué since
Shevardnadze had failed to quieten his doubts about Vietnam’s sincere
intention to withdraw all its forces from Cambodia by September –
the Chinese, he said, knew the Vietnamese better than the Soviets did.
China was putting the Soviet leaders on notice that much needed to be
done before they could count on its compliance.^20
Shevardnadze flew south to Shanghai in a Chinese Boeing-737 to
hold talks with Deng Xiaoping at his guesthouse. Old and wizened
though he was, the tiny Deng had a firm handshake and left no doubt
about his mental vigour. He entered the conversation without prelim-
inary flim-flam and eschewed small talk. Deng called in very broad
terms for a fresh start to be made in the Sino-Soviet relationship.
Shevardnadze was delighted. He tried to push things further along by
means of flattery: ‘Very wise!’ Deng spoke about their shared belief in
communism and expressed the hope that it would not take another
two millennia to realize the dream; he added that he was simultan-
eously committed to extending the Chinese market economy. Shevar -
d nadze interjected: ‘There’s a truth which runs as follows: it’s better
to take ash than fire from the past.’^21 Touching on Afghanistan, he