THE THIRD MAN BREAKS LOOSE 471range of tensions between America and the USSR, Primakov had only
the Iraq emergency on his agenda; and Primakov was keener than
Shevardnadze to find some way of accommodating Saddam.
Breaking with convention, Shevardnadze wrote confidentially to
State Department official Dennis Ross to express disquiet about
Gorbachëv’s line of conduct. Tarasenko handed the letter to a trusted
contact in the American embassy. Shevardnadze wanted Baker to
know where he stood on the emergency in the Persian Gulf.^58 Shevard-
nadze himself met Bush and Baker in a sequence of meetings in New
York between 22 September and 5 October. Bush wanted to place his
‘bets on partnership’. If Saddam displayed ‘irrational stubbornness’, he
said, the Soviet leadership would be able to act as mediator. It would
seem that Baker apologized for publicly condemning Stalin’s annex-
ation of the Baltic states. While all this was encouraging for Soviet
diplomacy, Shevardnadze asked Gorbachëv to avoid taking America’s
cooperation at the arms talks for granted. He reminded Gorbachëv
about the current chances of getting financial credits to the value of
$4 billion from the Saudis and $400 million from the Kuwaitis. Spain
had offered $1 billion. On this ‘delicate’ question, Shevardnadze
hinted, the credits were unlikely to arrive if Soviet foreign policy con-
flicted with American purposes in the Persian Gulf.^59
The amount of aid being made available was changeable, and Gor-
bachëv strove to preserve the dignity of the USSR. Baker had striven
to show good faith by travelling to Moscow in mid-September and
taking a group of American business leaders with him representing
Chevron, PepsiCo and other large corporations. The hope was to facil-
itate industrial and commercial investment. It was a timely intervention
because Gorbachëv was introducing Shatalin’s ‘500 Days Programme’
to transform the Soviet economy.^60 The American businessmen felt
unimpressed by the deals on offer, and they saw for themselves the
chaotic conditions in society and the economy. Gorbachëv himself was
under pressure from Prime Minister Ryzhkov to moderate Shatalin’s
radicalism. The 500 Days Programme was steadily emasculated. This
pleased Ryzhkov and infuriated Yeltsin (and was to drive Gorbachëv’s
radical economics adviser Nikolai Petrakov to resign in December).^61
Gorbachëv was striving to keep some elements of radicalism
without annoying its bitter opponents. It was an impossible task. But
he was not yet willing to concede defeat.
He did at least recognize the urgent need for direct financial aid
and pleaded with Baker for an interest-free loan of $1.5 billion. Baker