A NEW WORLD ORDER? 479Baltic republics, he wanted to free himself of any obligation to defend
policies he did not believe in.^36
Around the world there was concern that recent events could
lead to renewed tensions in world politics. Gorbachëv had already
dropped many of the prominent reformers; and he was continuing to
baulk Bush’s purposes in the Persian Gulf. The NATO powers deeply
regretted Shevardnadze’s departure. Baker told the American media:
‘I am proud to call this man a friend . . . I would have to tell you that
I’m going to miss him.’^37
Gorbachëv spoke no ill of his departed friend and ally;^38 and Shev-
ardnadze continued to accept that Gorbachëv, if possible, ‘wanted to
remain a democrat’.^39 Though they tried to stay on good terms, per-
sonal concerns had agitated Shevardnadze for some time. He mused
that political leaders ought to retire on reaching the age of sixty-five
- otherwise they begin to experience the old man’s syndrome and
think only about how to preserve their personal power.^40 Inside
Gorbachëv’s entourage there was talk that Shevardnadze had selfish
motives for resignation. Chernyaev thought he wished to heap all the
responsibility for the USSR’s troubles on to Gorbachëv.^41 Falin made a
more specific guess. He reckoned that Shevardnadze knew that people
in Moscow knew that he had told Baker that he approved of the
Ameri can military action and wanted the USSR to join the coalition.
If called to account, he would not be able to talk himself out of
trouble.^42
Gorbachëv continued to canvass the NATO powers for a peaceful
solution to the crisis in the Persian Gulf. He was under enormous
internal pressure in the USSR as the feeling grew that he had been too
willing to concede to Washington’s demands in foreign policy and
too complacent about the internal benefits of perestroika. Elites
and people were troubled by the effects of economic and administra-
tive dissolution. Gorbachëv sensed the need to be seen to hearken to
what the critics and sceptics were saying even when he had no inten-
tion of acting on their advice. Sometimes he could hardly believe his
ears, as when KGB Chairman Kryuchkov reported that the Americans
were considering the use of nuclear weapons in Iraq. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs wrote to denounce this as nonsense. Chernyaev did the
same.^43 Gorbachëv was able to consider both sides before tactfully
ignoring the KGB. He himself was no sympathizer of Saddam. He had
constantly urged him to pull out of Kuwait and believed that war was
avoidable. He underestimated Saddam’s intransigence and imprudence