488 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
no money on the table in London, and agrees that there must be seri-
ous concrete work in advance.’^38
Secretary Baker came before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on 11 July to plead for Congress to ratify of the Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. He said it was crucial to guaranteeing
an end to the USSR’s massive preponderance of troops and weaponry
and to consolidating democracy throughout the continent.^39
On 17 July Bush and Gorbachëv had a preliminary discussion at
the American embassy in London before the summit. Gorbachëv
asked Bush directly what kind of USSR he wanted to work with. If
billions of dollars could be found for the Gulf War, was it not sensible
to assist the transformation of the Soviet Union? Bush replied that
America wished for a democratic, dynamic USSR integrated into the
world ‘community’ of nations; he denied taking pleasure from
Gorbachëv’s misfortunes. Gorbachëv stressed that he needed to be
cautious in running down the military sector of his economy – arma-
ments were the sector where the USSR’s best inventors and engineers
were to be found. Bush found it convenient to change the subject to
Lubavich Jewish manuscripts and then to Yasser Arafat.^40 Gorbachëv
had not expected total success, but Bush was offering even less than
he had imagined. As he explained to his British hosts, the world’s
economic powers had to understand that his reforms would require
many more years of effort. He protested about the continued embargo
on technological transfer. His mood was bleak. He knew that if he
returned to Moscow without some kind of deal, he could only expect
the worst: ‘Then [even] ten angels will not be able to save us.’^41
When they lunched again on 23 July, Bush blushed and avoided
eye contact with the Soviet President.^42 Disclaiming any wish to inter-
fere in the USSR’s affairs, he repeated that Gorbachëv could expect no
foreign direct investment until the Kremlin introduced democracy
and market economics and regularized its relations with the Soviet
republics in a properly federal fashion.^43 Gorbachëv had come to
London with cap in hand. He left without having obtained the offer of
a single dollar. The London trip had proved to be a humiliation.
Less than a week passed before Bush arrived in Moscow to sign
the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms (or START in its usual acronym). Work by the expert teams on
both sides had ironed out the remaining creases, and neither Gor-
bachëv nor Bush wished their own latest failure to achieve a financial
entente to hold things up. On 31 July 1991 they put pen to paper. The