ENDINGS 487advance with the President. Anti-reform deputies lined up to lambast
Gorbachëv.^28
This made fertile ground for rumours about a move to overthrow
the President. There had been several scares in the previous year, and
Gorbachëv had brushed them aside. He gave offence by telling a visi-
tor from a foreign intelligence agency, in Kryuchkov’s hearing, that he
was fed up with the bias in the KGB’s reports.^29 Pavlov complained
about the reluctance of Western banks to advance financial credits.^30
Yazov questioned the original need for perestroika: ‘So why did we
generally need this?’^31 Boldin accused the radicals of searching for
ways ‘to surrender to Yeltsin’.^32 Baklanov continued to grumble about
Gorbachëv’s disarmament initiatives.^33 Akhromeev had come to
believe that Gorbachëv had destroyed the USSR’s defensive capacity.^34
The American administration worried on the Soviet President’s behalf.
On 23 June Bush rang him near midnight. Chernyaev gave an order
for them to be put in contact with each other, but Gorbachëv was
somewhere out of his apartment with Raisa. Next morning Gorbachëv
told Kryuchkov and Boldin that the failure to find him was a gross
dereliction of duty.^35 It was in the same frantic weeks that reports
reached Gorbachëv from his own people that suspicious troop move-
ments had been taking place outside Moscow – and Primakov
counselled Gorbachëv to avoid putting too much faith in the KGB.^36
Gorbachëv ignored the alert and focused on the agenda of politi-
cal, national and economic problems. He and his supporters put up
candidates against Yeltsin in elections for the presidency of the Rus-
sian republic in June 1991. Yeltsin won by a handsome majority.
Gorbachëv recognized reality and held regular discussions with him.
Priority was given to finding a way to build a new federal system for
the USSR. Equally urgent for him was to alleviate difficulties in the
economy. The shops were almost empty of goods for consumers. Pop-
ular discontent grew. The Supreme Soviet was increasingly raucous.
Now, more than ever, he needed external assistance. Ambassador
Braithwaite called on Gorbachëv and extended a formal invitation
from Prime Minister Major to attend the G7 summit meeting in
London. Braithwaite and Gorbachëv noted the fading euphoria about
the end of the Cold War. Gorbachëv wanted the West to change its
attitude and recognize that he would not be travelling to London like
some small-time trader. He hoped for ‘a big principled conversation’.^37
But he had no illusions. Braithwaite recorded: ‘He knows there will be