CRACKS IN THE ICE: EASTERN EUROPE 69signal from the Polish communist leadership that they remained com-
mitted to communism. He asked why the Poles, decades after the start
of communist rule, had still not completed the collectivization of agri-
culture. Suslov hushed him by pointing out that Jaruzelski had more
urgent tasks at a time when Solidarity posed a threat to communist
rule.^21
On 13 December 1981 Jaruzelski introduced martial law, threw
Solidarity leaders and activists into prison and seized their printing
presses. He was never to express regret for what he did. He reasoned
that if he had not acted as he did, the USSR would have invaded. He
claimed that Brezhnev had confirmed exactly this intention when they
talked on 1 March 1981.^22
Martial law did not settle the situation in Poland but merely
delayed the moment of political explosion. The Western powers were
faced with a dilemma in deciding what they could do about the situa-
tion. Richard T. Davies, former US Ambassador in Warsaw, urged
Reagan to enable America to ‘resume its leadership of the free world’.^23
Davies also wrote to Haig suggesting that financial credits to Poland
should be made conditional upon the granting of reforms.^24 Reagan
did not need to be prodded. He spoke with passion at the National
Security Council: ‘I took a stand that this may be the last chance in our
lifetime to see a change in the Soviet Empire’s colonial policy re East-
ern Europe.’ His preference was to place an embargo on trade and even
communication with the USSR until martial law was lifted, political
prisoners were released and talks were started with Lech Wałęsa and
Solidarity. He banked on impressing on all NATO countries that
they would risk estrangement from Washington if they failed to show
the same toughness.^25 As he drafted his Christmas message to the
American people, Poland remained close to his heart: ‘We can’t let
this revolution against Communism fail without offering a hand.’^26
Thatcher expressed her support but other NATO leaders were more
guarded in their statements.^27
Even the Vatican took a cautious view. Cardinal Casaroli assured
Reagan in December 1981 that ‘the time was not yet ripe for major
change in Eastern Europe’. Reagan explained his general strategy as
moving beyond the constraints of mutually assured destruction
towards big reductions in the number of weapons on both sides.^28
Casaroli in the same year was intervening with the Kremlin frequently
on the Polish question.^29 Neither Pope nor General Secretary wished
to see violent trouble in Warsaw. John Paul II made his second papal