94 World War Two and the Partisan Struggle
Offensive as it was called by the Partisans, on 20 January 1943. It was to develop
in three progressive phases: the first two aimed at the total destruction of
“Tito’s state” in Croatia, the third at the suppression of Mihailović’s movement
in Herzegovina and Montenegro.^238 Although Tito did not order a general
mobilization in the “Republic of Bihać,” after the successes of the Liberation
Army and of the Partisan forces, young people had begun to flock to their
units, so he was able to create a new “Dalmatian” division. According to the
plans of the Supreme Staff, these forces would move the following spring to
Montenegro and southern Serbia with the task of stirring up revolt in those
regions and overcoming the local “counterrevolution.” At the end of 1942, Tito
sent his best troops in that direction, which appeared providential when he
found himself in the midst of Operation Weiss. Although at that moment the
weather conditions were adverse, with temperatures at -25°C, he had no other
choice than to follow the bulk of his troops and order a retreat from Bosnian
Krajina. Meanwhile he was confronted by a terrible dilemma: what to do with
the nearly four thousand wounded scattered in the woods around Bihać? If
he abandoned them, he could maneuver easily but their fate would be sealed.
Since the occupiers did not recognize the Partisans as a military force but
considered them “bandits,” they would be shot when captured.^239 Therefore,
Tito decided to take them along, in Velebit’s words, hanging a millstone around
his neck. The chaos was even worse because the local Serb and Muslim popula-
tion—about fifty thousand people—fearing the Ustaša, fled with the Partisans,
and Tito had no choice but to accept them, although he did not know how he
would feed them.^240
In the beginning of January, the Supreme Staff was already receiving infor-
mation about the amassing enemy troops on the borders of the free territory.
Although it expected the “Fourth Offensive,” it made no attempts to resist or
to inform the various branches of its apparatus, such as the health service, of its
imminent arrival.^241 According to Djilas, Tito had no particular military capac-
ities, although in an article written during the war and published by the Soviet
newspaper Voina i rabochii klass (War and the working class) Djilas asserted the
contrary. In that article he praised Tito so blatantly that the Soviet editor
had to reproach him: “In the USSR we write in this way only about Stalin.”^242
During the Fourth Offensive, especially during the battles on the Rama and
Neretva rivers, Tito often changed his directives, with potentially fatal conse-
quences. “The most human battle in history,” the “battle for the wounded,” the
battle on the Rama and Neretva ended as well as it did not because of the abil-
ity of the commander in chief, as propaganda later proclaimed, but thanks to
the inventiveness of the commanders of the individual units. They soon became
aware of Tito’s weak points and began adapting his orders to the circumstances,