112 World War Two and the Partisan Struggle
to the AVNOJ to elect me in the next session as president of the National
Committee and the chief of the army.” Modestly, he added that he did not
agree: “I need your help to convince the comrades. In my opinion, this would
not be favorably accepted abroad.”^319 Naturally, he immediately got the “help”
requested from Dimitrov, who declared that the nomination would not be
“appropriate.”^320
Tito’s reaction to this is significant: he decided that it was no longer neces-
sary to inform the Russians “about everything,” so as not to give them the
chance to sabotage the AVNOJ before it started. During the following two
weeks, he did not send detailed information about preparatory work, but did
allow Atanasov to describe, in two dispatches, the situation in the Partisan
ranks. “The Communist Party,” the Bulgarian wrote, “is the only force capable
of creating the new Yugoslav State.”^321 In the message that Tito sent to Dimi-
trov on 26 November 1943, he refrained from mentioning the decision about
the monarchy, as well as the “unexpected” proposal of the Slovenian delegation
to give him the title of “marshal,” the highest rank of the Red Army, until then
unknown in Yugoslavia.^322 It is doubtful that this proposal was really spontane-
ous, since on 29 October Tito had already signed the diplomas of the Supreme
Staff ’s officers school as “marshal.”^323 When the title was offered to him offi-
cially, he blushed and asked in embarrassment: “Aren’t you exaggerating? And
what will the Russians say?” Kardelj and the others hastened to reassure him.
If the Russians had their own marshals, why shouldn’t Yugoslavia? When this
topic came up for discussion in the assembly at the AVNOJ session, according
to Djilas, there was “an enthusiastic and exhilirated unanimity” and no end to
hysterical applause, cheering, hugs, and kisses.^324 The next day, 30 November
1943, the presidency of the AVNOJ published an official decree “in order to give
well-deserved recognition to comrade Josip Broz-Tito, the Commander in
Chief, for his brilliant leadership of the operations of the National Liberation
Army and of the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia, and for his capability
and decisiveness in shaping them into their present form.”^325
Kardelj eloquently described how relations with Moscow deteriorated: “First
of all we decided not to inform Moscow about this, because we were convinced
that they would be against it. We still believed they were revolutionaries, but for
tactical reasons, we did not want to inform them. Throughout our National
Liberation struggle, they subordinated their relations with us to their political
goals, which were aimed at maintaining good contacts with the Americans and
the British. They thought it would be better to sacrifice the revolution in Yugo-
slavia than to quarrel on its account with the English and the Americans.
We knew well that we could not count on them, and that we had to leave the
Russians aside if we wanted to succeed.”^326