162 The Postwar Period
would not engage in discussion, but had to be obeyed. “In a strange way, merely
by changing the tone of his voice, or his facial expression, Tito could signal
that his interlocutor had crossed the line—that there had been a transgression.
He could listen attentively (or pretend to) and not interrupt, especially if some-
one was speaking succinctly, but sometimes he cut in with incredible sharp-
ness, putting you right back in your place.”^67 This change was also observed by
Fitzroy Maclean when he returned to Yugoslavia in 1947. He reported to the
Foreign Office that the marshal seemed detached from the everyday life of the
common people with whom he had shared the difficulties and hardships of
the Partisan struggle: he delegated authority to individuals not always worthy
of his trust and gave the impression of not being completely aware of the situ-
ation at home and abroad. And he did not permit anyone near him who would
dare to tell him an unpleasant truth.^68
The Paris Peace ConferenceAt the gathering of the three great powers in Potsdam, the British accused
Yugoslavia of contravening the Yalta agreements, which provoked objections
from the Soviets.^69 In fact, despite the recent skirmishes between Tito and
Stalin, in the lead-up to the Paris Peace Conference, the Soviets supported
Yugoslavia’s border claims against Italy and Austria. On 21 October 1946, Tito
argued that the Soviet Union provided a “strong guarantee” of Yugoslav in-
dependence.^70 He was right: between the 1 and 26 December, a meeting was
convened in Moscow, where the foreign ministers of the United Kindom and
United States yielded to Molotov’s pressure and agreed that, despite significant
reservations with regard to Tito’s regime, their governments would recognize
the newborn Yugoslav Republic.^71
London’s recognition at the end of 1945, and Washington’s in April 1946,
did not mean, however, that the British and Americans would give Yugoslavia
an easy time. President Truman put it plainly when he recommended that his
newly appointed ambassador, Richard C. Patterson, adopt a “two-fisted, tough
policy with Tito.”^72 The Allies refused, for instance, to return the Yugoslav
Danube fleet, which had been requisitioned by the Germans and transported
to the Reich, or the gold reserves deposited in their banks by Prince Paul before
the war.^73 Even worse, at the end of 1945 the British and American spy agen-
cies joined forces with the help of émigrés and dissident cells in Slovenia and
Croatia who were attempting to continue the fight against the Communists.
This underground uprising reinforced the importance of UDBA (Uprava
državne bez bednosti; State Security Administration), as OZNA was renamed
in 1946. It became the regime’s primary safeguard, playing an increasingly
important role in the new order.^74