168 The Postwar Period
materials. They began to protest this policy, applied not only to Yugoslavia but
to other “people’s democracies,” as the states under Soviet tutelage in Central
and Eastern Europe were called. Discontent was restricted first to Tito’s inner
circle, but soon became widespread. The marshal remained careful but stub-
born, engaged as he was in a difficult struggle with an ideology that he had up
to that point believed in: the building of socialism under the Soviet flag.^103
Savelii V. Burtakov, the Soviet “resident” embedded in Belgrade, reported
back to the NKVD on “the Eagle” (Tito’s code name): “Alongside his positive
qualities—popularity, good looks, an expressive face, courage and willpower—
the Eagle has the following flaws: lust for power, lack of modesty, arrogance, and
insincerity. He sees himself as the supreme authority, prefers unquestioning obe-
dience, and dislikes exchanges of views and criticism of his orders; he is irritable,
hot-tempered and curt—and a poseur.” According to Burtakov, Tito should not
be wholly trusted in his dealings with London, “though he makes an outward
show of his supposed hostility towards the Allies, particularly the British.”^104
Tito and Ranković, his spy master, in turn took a dim view of Burtakov,
who become notorious for his habit of looting jewelry and other precious items
requisitioned from Belgrade’s wealthy families. At the end of the year he was
replaced as chief advisor to OZNA by Arsen V. Tishkov, known by the Yugo-
slavs as Timofeev. But tensions with Tishkov soon arose, too, when his agents,
who were spread all over the country, began to be criticized for their arrogant
behavior. Their attempts to entice Yugoslavs into being their collaborators pro-
voked even greater disapproval—among those approached by Timofeev’s men
was, in fact, a young woman who was one of Tito’s cryptographers at the cipher
office. When Ranković informed Tito of this incident, he exploded: “We will
not tolerate a network of spies. Tell them that immediately.”^105
Balkan PlansEven more serious disagreements came to a head in the second part of 1946,
when a civil war erupted between the Greek government in Athens and com-
munist units led by General Markos Vafeiades. Tito supported Vafeiades, con-
sidering it his Bolshevik duty, although Stalin did not feel the same way, having
agreed with Churchill about the division of the Balkans and having ceded
Greece to the British. After the war, Stalin was convinced that an armed con-
frontation with the West was inevitable, but he was realistic enough to remain
mindful of the Soviet Union’s weakness—and its lack of an atomic bomb.^106 For
this reason, he was inclined to stay in favor with the West (for the time being,
at least), keeping relations cordial and not provoking them any more than was
wise. Tito had no such hesitation, determined as he was to transform Yugoslavia
into the revolutionary center of all of Mediterranean Europe, including Greece,