The Postwar Period 169
Italy, and even Spain. He paid little attention to public opinion in the United
States and Britain, which had opposed his territorial ambitions at the peace
conference, even provoking them by shooting down an American airplane and
providing military help to Greek insurgents. In spite of the prohibition of the
United Nations, Belgrade secretly aided the Greek insurgents, which reinforced
the Truman administration’s suspicion that Tito was a mere executor of Stalin’s
policy in the Balkans. In December 1946, following a request from Washington,
the United Nations formed a Special Inquiry Commission tasked with estab-
lishing whether neighboring “people’s democracies”—primarily Yugoslavia—
were indeed arming the rebels, as the Greek government claimed.^107
Meanwhile, the British, who had given the shaky Greek “democracy” mili-
tary support for some time, were unable to continue their commitment due
to serious problems arising in India and Palestine. In March 1947, Truman
declared that the United States would take up this role of helping legal gov-
ernments who were threatened by “armed minorities or foreign pressure.”^108
This became a cornerstone of American foreign policy, underpinned by their
conviction that the containment of communism was essential. In the face of a
Greek crisis, and fears that Stalin would increase pressure on Turkey, the pres-
ence of American naval forces in the Aegean Sea escalated conspicuously in the
following months. As a consequence, Yugoslav leaders resumed talks with the
Bulgarians about a federation, which had begun at Stalin’s and Dimitrov’s ini-
tiative back in October 1943.^109
The idea of a federation was so appealing to the Yugoslavs that in January
1945 they had proposed a treaty between the two states. The Soviets were more
circumspect, arguing that such an important decision would need detailed
preparation and suggesting a twenty-year pact of friendship and collaboration
first. This had to happen discreetly, as the new Yugoslavia had not yet received
international recognition. “In the area of foreign policy,” said Stalin, “we have
to be careful. Our task is to build on the victories we’ve achieved.”^110
Problems quickly emerged, as the Yugoslavs wanted Bulgaria to enter their
federation as its seventh republic, whereas the Bulgarians insisted that a dual
state be formed, similar to the former Austria-Hungary. At first, Stalin was in
favor of dualism but later agreed with the Yugoslavs, which the Bulgarians—
to Dimitrov’s dismay—humbly accepted.^111 The possibility was soon quashed,
however, when the British protested, declaring that, as a defeated country, Bul-
garia could not establish an independent foreign policy. They were convinced
that a federation would strengthen the Soviet Union in the Balkans and influ-
ence the situation in Greece and Turkey. Stalin, who before the Yalta Confer-
ence was hesitant to cause unnecessary discord with the West, agreed, ordering
an interruption of the talks.^112