The Postwar Period 179
Djilas even argued that the CPSU was likely to “place enormous pressure on us,
as the new Yugoslavia is becoming an important center of ideological dissent.”
The problem was this: How would socialism continue to develop? Through
independence or via the expansion of the Soviet Union?^162 All agreed that it
was essential to have a strong army to guarantee their ongoing sovereignty. “We
will have to make great sacrifices for the military sector and its armaments,”
concluded Tito. “The words from [Moscow] offer us nothing. I believe we can
maintain the army by ourselves.”^163
Only Žujović, “the Black One,” was meaningfully silent. He was an intel-
ligent man, of great political experience, who made the mistake of binding
himself too closely to the Russians. (Suffice it to say that, in the years after the
war, he visited Crimea five times for “health reasons”; this aroused suspicion,
as comrades started to see him as too pro-Soviet.)^164 Since no one wanted to
inflame relations with Russia, at the end of the meeting they decided that what
had been said should be kept secret from the Soviet ambassador. But Žujović
did not comply. Thanks to his tip-off, Lavrent’ev was able to send Moscow a
detailed report of the meeting, relaying the assertion of General Ivan Gošnjak,
among others, that Soviet policy was a hindrance to global revolution, as well
as Tito’s response to this statement: “It’s true!” The dispatch went directly to
Stalin, who asked Molotov to convey his thanks to Žujović for such precious
information: “Your work is vital to the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav people,
exposing as it does the ‘wrong comrades’ in the Yugoslav CC.”^165
On 9 March, Lavrent’ev sent another letter to Moscow, in which he described
the views of Žujović and Bosnian premier Rodoljub Čolaković. They argued
that it was possible to save Yugoslavia from the trap it was caught in only
through the intervention of the CPSU, given that Tito held all the levers of
power and brooked no opposition. On one side, they said, was the party elite,
accustomed to total power; on the other side were those of inferior rank who
were not organized and ideologically weak. According to Žujović, Tito could
not prevent the integration of Yugoslavia with the Soviet Union, if such a plan
could be devised. Knowing that for the time being the international situation
would not allow it, however, he suggested that a party delegation should come
from Moscow for frank and decisive discussions. If the Yugoslav leaders would
not accept this, he was prepared to denounce them publicly. He also had other
suspicions: Wasn’t it possible that Tito was in secret contact with the British
and Americans through his middleman, Vlatko Velebit?^166
That same day, on 9 March 1948, Lavrent’ev informed Moscow that the
Yugoslav government was denying him all information and ordering their
secret services to close off access. The previous summer the decision had been
made to deny sensitive data regarding the Five-Year Plan to all dip lomatic